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This study investigates the impact of sovereign credit ratings on foreign exchange rate returns 
for a sample of 27 African countries over the period 2003–2018 to examine the response of the 
exchange rates around the time of sovereign rating announcements. The data consist of long-
term foreign currency sovereign ratings, outlooks, watch lists and daily exchange rates. The 
study applies a combination of an event study methodology using both univariate and 
multivariate analyses and the Granger causality tests in a panel framework as well as impulse 
response tests. The results suggest that, in Africa, exchange rates do not react significantly to 
changes in sovereign credit rating announcements. No significant evidence of contagion was 
found. It is thus implied that foreign exchange rates do not react significantly to new 
information from credit rating agencies which shows a disjoint between macro-economic 
fundamental performance and financial markets. African countries are encouraged to focus on 
stabilising their currencies, as well as attending to macro-economic fundamentals that will 
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1.1. Research background 
Financial and economic integration has increased internationally and sovereign credit ratings 
(SCR) have become one of the most important elements in directing the global capital flows 
(Haspolat, 2015). Capital flows are an important source of external funding that developing 
countries rely on for financing savings gaps and to fast track economic development and 
growth. Additionally, capital flows have proven to be an important source of investment for 
developing economies since the emergence of financial globalisation which is evidenced by the 
steady growth of flows from developed economies to emerging markets (Eraslan, 2017). In 
addition, policies enacted after the 2008 global financial crisis led to an increase in capital flows 
from developed countries to emerging markets. In times of high international liquidity, 
developing economies attract high levels of capital flows. Similarly, as evidenced by the Asian 
currency crisis of 1997, during periods of financial distress or increased political or economic 
risk, capital flight is experienced as capital flows move away from emerging markets given 
their volatile nature (Gaillard, 2012). As postulated by Kodongo and Ojah (2013), foreign 
exchange rates drive private investment and this is the classical economist theory.  
In the same fashion, Eraslan (2017) postulates that emerging markets are more sensitive and 
vulnerable to capital flows due to the linkages between capital flows and financial indicators 
such as exchange rate, interest rate and inflation. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by 
the fact that most emerging markets, especially those in Africa, adopted a raft of stabilisation 
and liberalisation economic policies such as the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets and 
the relaxation of restrictions on exports and imports championed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Figure 1 below shows the foreign exchange rate regimes of the African countries 







Table 1: Exchange rate regimes in Africa in 2004 
(Source: IMF Annual report in exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions) 
Exchange rate regime Currency 
Exchange rate volatility* 
2002–2005 
to the USD 
Independent floating     
DRC Congolese Franc 6.8 
Malawi Kwacha 5.6 
South Africa Rand 6.7 
Uganda Ugandan Shilling 4.5 
      
Managed floating     
Angola Kwanza 6.3 
Egypt Egyptian Pound 6.2 
Ghana Cedi 2.7 
Kenya Kenyan Shilling 4.2 
Mauritius Mauritian Rupee 4.6 
Mozambique Metical 6.3 
Nigeria Naira 4.0 
Rwanda Rwanda Franc 3.8 
Zambia Kwacha 8.0 
      
Pegged     
Botswana Pula 6.7 
Cape Verde Cape Verde Escudo 5.3 
Lesotho Loti 6.7 
Morocco Dirham 4.8 
Seychelles Seychelles Rupee 2.3 
Tunisia Tunisian Dinar 5.1 
Namibia Namibian Dollar 6.7 
Benin CFA Franc 5.3 
Burkina Faso CFA Franc 5.3 
Ivory Coast CFA Franc 5.3 
Senegal CFA Franc 5.3 
Cameroon CFA Franc 5.3 
Gabon CFA Franc 5.3 
Congo CFA Franc 5.3 
*Calculated as annualised standard deviation of monthly percentage change   
An exchange rate regime is a function of a country’s monetary policy that seeks to establish the 
exchange rate of its own currency against currencies of other countries, with independent and 
managed floating regimes classified under flexible regimes and the different kinds of pegs, such 
as crawling peg, currency basket peg, fixed exchange rate, band and crawling band, classified 
under fixed exchange rate regimes (Gudmundsson, 2006). When the country makes no attempt 
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to fix its exchange rate and the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate in response to foreign 
exchange mechanisms, such an exchange rate is termed a floating exchange rate regime 
whereas a fixed exchange rate regime is one in which the country pegs its currency’s exchange 
rate to another currency or a basket of currencies with significant government intervention 
(Senadza & Diaba, 2017).  
On the other hand, the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets meant that developing nations 
dropped currency pegs and adopted flexible or free floating exchange rate regimes. This move 
was meant to bring about an increase in growth, price stability and trade performance but sadly 
this has not been the case (Ndikumana, 2003).  Kodongo and Ojah (2013) note that exchange 
rates are reactive to cross-border trade and investment activities and that capital flows are 
affected by changes in the value of a country’s currency because perceptions about the risks of 
foreign investments influence foreign exchange rate behaviour. This relationship between 
capital flows and exchange rates makes it vital to study factors that affect exchange rates. 
Exchange rates are classified into the nominal exchange rate (NER) and the real exchange rate 
(RER). While NER refers to the monetary concept that measures the relative price of currencies 
between two countries, RER is a real concept that measures the relative price of goods between 
two countries (Edwards, 1987). Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) posit that, in emerging markets, 
the importance of exchange rate behaviour for economic stability is highlighted by the currency 
crises that attract interest in exchange rate dynamics. Correspondingly, foreign exchange rates 
play a pivotal role in a country’s international trade and consequently influence the balance of 
payment of that country (Monica & Santhiyavali, 2017).  
In addition, exchange rate movements are of great interest to governments, cross border traders 
and investors, as well as multinational corporations operating in the region. According to 
Senadza and Diaba (2017), the advent of floating exchange rate regimes in Africa brought with 
it exchange rate volatility which is generally perceived to have negative effects on international 
trade and that exchange rate volatility has a short-run negative impact on exports in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Equally important, Twin (2019) posits that exchange rates are among  the most-
watched, analysed and manipulated economic indicators by governments because they are one 
of the determinants of a country’s economic health and play a significant role in the level of 
trade in a country. 
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Consequently, when the local currency is stronger, it is beneficial for importers, but when the 
currency depreciates, it harms exports and foreign asset values (Hsing, 2016). In agreement, 
Fang Lai and Miller (2009) found that exchange rate risks, negative or positive, in a period of 
depreciation or appreciation affect exports for all countries studied. Furthermore, Eraslan 
(2017) argues that, in emerging markets, the nexus between financial indicators and capital 
flows makes emerging markets more sensitive and vulnerable to capital movements with the 
size of capital flows being the primary determinant of short-run exchange rate movements.  
Extensive research has been done on the nexus between capital flows and financial indicators 
such as inflation, interest rates and exchange rates. Eraslan (2017) postulates that exchange 
rates are sensitive and respond quickly to news. Published financial statements, announcements 
from banks, news on rescue or bailout packages as well as announcements from credit rating 
agencies have an effect on exchange rate movements. There is little that can be found in 
literature about the impact of sovereign credit ratings announcements on exchange rates, 
especially in Africa. 
The credit rating agencies originated in the United States of America (USA) in 1841 when the 
first mercantile credit rating agency was established after the 1837 financial crisis with ratings 
being applied to securities especially the railroad bonds in the early 1900s (Packer & Cantor, 
1994). The earliest sovereign credit rating (SCR) was in the 1940s when Moody’s Investor 
Service (Moody’s) issued the first US long term domestic and foreign currency rating (Cantor 
& Packer, (1996). The interest in sovereign credit ratings peaked in the 1980s with the growth 
of the bond market due to the relaxation of financial regulations and the global expansion of 
capital markets.  
Sovereign credit ratings reflect the assessments of a sovereign country’s capacity and 
willingness to repay its debts (Jaramillo, 2010). In its first 1918 Manual and Investment Letters, 
Moody’s defined its sovereign ratings as the relative creditworthiness of government. This 
measure has two components: the ability and the willingness (or the “good faith”) to repay the 
debt (Gaillard, 2012). According to Jaramillo and Tejada (2011), developing nations seek the 
investment-grade rating to reduce costs of borrowing for the country and corporates as well as 




Cantor and Packer (1996) proffer eight variables they claim to make up more than 90% of 
sovereign ratings assigned by both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. These variables are: GDP 
growth, fiscal balance, debt-to-export ratio, inflation, current account balance, an indicator 
variable of an advanced economy and an indicator of variable default since 1970. An 
unfavourable change in these variables leads to a credit downgrading. These credit ratings are 
an indication of the economic, financial and political situation of an economy and signal 
essential information regarding a country’s development to governments and international 
financial markets (Afonso, 2003). In concurrence with Afonso (2003) on the importance of 
sovereign credit ratings, Reinhart (2008) states that ratings play a pivotal role in determining 
the terms and the extent to which nations have access to international capital markets. Boot, 
Todd and Anjolein (2006) posit that credit ratings act as a coordinating mechanism in situations 
where multiple equilibria can obtain and, as such, play a meaningful economic role. Between 
2003 and 2018, more African countries received credit ratings than the period before 2003. 
During this period, all African countries that received sovereign credit ratings were downgraded 
with only seven exceptions (Botswana, Seychelles, Mauritius, Morocco, Rwanda, Tunisia and 
Burkina Faso). This brought about an increased interest in sovereign credit ratings and their 
increased significance (Kräussl, 2005a). Therefore, there is a need to investigate the impact of 
sovereign credit ratings on the exchange rates of countries comprising the African Union (AU). 
The results of this investigation will have important implications at policy level given the 
January 2012 proposed Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by the African Union that would 
pave the way for the establishment of the Continental Customs Union and the African Customs 
Union (Mevel & Karingi, 2012). The results will also inform policymakers on how sovereign 
credit rating announcements affect exchange rate volatility. Understanding exchange rate 
volatility in Africa is vital because it hinders trade, productivity, and investment in the long run 
(Chou, 2000); Bleaney & Greenaway, (2001), Aghion et al., (2010). 
Countries use sovereign debt to deal with budgetary constraints. Therefore, sovereign debt 
plays a vital role in the economic growth and development of both emerging and developed 
nations. The ability of a sovereign government to borrow from international credit markets 
depends on its perceived ability to repay and on the incentives it will have to do this (Gelos et 
al., 2011). According to Cantor and Packer (1996), investors prefer rated securities over unrated 
ones of similar credit risk. Investors are therefore interested in knowing the sovereign risk and 
related default probability and this where credit rating agencies play a role. Duygun, Oztuk and 
Shaban (2016) contend that credit rating agencies play a critical role in determining countries’ 
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access to capital and the cost thereof because international investors’ decisions are based on 
comparative assets in the same class and ratings puts a particular country in a class based on its 
willingness and capacity to pay. Additionally, Kräussl (2003) argues that rating changes affect 
the size and volatility of capital flows to emerging markets. 
The three most influential credit rating agencies that are dominant in assessing the solvency of 
countries are Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch 
Ratings (Fitch). Credit ratings provided by these agencies influence how sovereign countries 
access international markets (Reinhart, 2002). Credit rating agencies’ outputs are used to guide 
investment choices of government agencies and key institutional investors in the capital 
markets (pension funds, investment banks and other financial institutions) (Tennant & Tracey, 
2016). Credit rating agencies use different methodologies to come up with sovereign credit 
ratings. They have standardised symbols and explanations to depict the credit rating scores. 
Figure 2 below shows the credit ratings and explanations from the three credit rating agencies, 
as well as the visual depiction of 271 sampled African countries’ assigned sovereign credit 
rating during the period under study. As can be seen, only six out of 27 sampled countries are 
classified as investment grade with Angola topping the list with an A rating while 78% of 
countries in Africa that received credit ratings fall in the non-investment grades of speculative 
and highly speculative. During the years of 2013 to 2018, as depicted in Figure 1 above, all 
African countries that received sovereign credit ratings were downgraded with only seven 





1Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo (Congo), Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire(Ivory Coast), Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Uganda and Zambia 
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Figure 1: Sovereign credit ratings of African countries 
(Sources: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, countryeconomy.com, tradingeconomics.com) 
 
1.2. An overview of sovereign credit announcements in Africa 
For purposes of this study, only the 27 African countries that received sovereign credit ratings 
in the period under study have been chosen. These countries are as follows: Angola, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, DRC, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia. Even though African 
countries started receiving sovereign credit ratings in the 1990s, it was only in 2003 that 10 out 
of the 27 countries received sovereign credit ratings. 
Credit rating agencies play a pivotal role in financial markets, but Eraslan (2017) argues that 
doubts about the significance of  credit rating agencies still linger since credit rating agencies 
have been accused of lagging behind markets instead of leading them. Since rating agencies are 
perceived to be highly influential, their sovereign debt announcements have a bearing on the 
financial systems of nations. The recent spate of downgrades of developing countries’ 
sovereign debt has brought ratings into the spotlight again (Mugobo & Mutize, 2016). The 
exchange rate fluctuations of African currencies against the US dollar was noted by Singh and 
Saiia (2013) to be a significant cause of concern for the African countries as it negatively affects 
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their trade, especially for exports and intra-Africa trade. According to Langner (2016), as shown 
in Figure 3a below, Fitch, Moody's and S&P took 1,971 negative rating actions on emerging-
market sovereign and government-related entities in 2016.2 Figure 3b below focuses on African 
countries and shows the distribution of sovereign credit ratings given to African countries by 
the three leading credit rating agencies from 1994 to 2018. The graph shows that, during the 
period under study (2013–2018), most African economies received sovereign credit ratings 
with 15 countries in 2003 and 30 countries from 2015 through to 2018. Over two-thirds of the 
rated African countries were placed in and below non-investment grade, indicating that 
obligations are considered as speculative grade indicating high credit risk. During the period 
under study, only five of the rated African countries were rated A and BB (the upper and lower 
medium grades). Figure 3c below shows Africa’s sovereign credit rating upgrade and 
downgrade trends from 1994 to 2018. During the period under study (2003–2018), the number 
of downgrades increased exponentially as more African countries began receiving credit 
ratings. 
Figures 1 and 2 thus support the narrative that unsolicited ratings for African countries are 
biased downward which agrees with results from empirical studies conducted by Poon (2003) 
as well as the narrative that credit rating agencies are biased against developing countries as 
reported by The Economist (2017). Poon used time series analysis with cross-sectional data 
from 15 countries during the period from 1998 to 2000 and found that unsolicited ratings are 
lower than solicited ratings. 
Even though sovereign credit ratings have become a significant part of macroprudential 
regulation and industry guidelines and play a pivotal role for emerging markets’ access to 
capital (Christopher et al., 2012), credit rating agencies have been under criticism since the 
Asian crisis, the European debit crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008 (Gaillard, 2012).  
Credit rating agencies have been accused of not being able to foretell economic crises and for 
exacerbating existing financial crises by giving sudden downgrades and negative outlooks of 
the affected countries. Sy, Cantor, Carvajal et al (2009) argue that credit ratings contributed to 
the 2008/9 global financial crisis. The authors further found that downgrades led to systemic 
market losses and illiquidity due to the financial markets’ increased reliance on ratings despite 
the systemic risk inherent to ratings. The authors further argue for macro-prudential regulation 
 




of credit rating agencies in order to reduce conflict of interest, increasing transparency and 
encouraging completion. Having investigated the damaging bias of sovereign credit ratings, 
Vernazza and Nielsen (2015) found that the subjective component of sovereign credit ratings 
does not predict defaults and that it biased default predictions in the wrong direction lending 
credence to criticisms from emerging economies. The authors argue that credit rating agencies 
should be stripped of their regulatory power and be assigned to an international body. The credit 
rating agencies must be forced to significantly increase transparency by publishing a breakdown 
of their objective and subjective components of the ratings they issue as well as minutes of 
rating committees and the voting records. This call for increased transparency in how credit 
ratings are arrived at builds on the call by Marwan (2008) who argues that the lack of 
competition in the rating industry leads to the distrust of the ratings and the process by nations 
receiving negative ratings. The author argues for the creation of new rating agencies and making 
sure the new regulations channel business to these new agencies which requires policy action 
at both national and international levels. 
 Haspolat (2015) found that rating announcements do not reflect the real economic and social 
position of the rated countries. Credit rating agencies have been accused of being biased against 
Africa countries and a number of African countries have started to protest against these ratings 
or reject them outright. According to Mutize (2019), in 2015, Zambia encouraged investors to 
ignore unsolicited downgrades from credit rating agencies; Namibia rejected a downgrade from 
Moody’s in 2017;  Nigeria strongly disagreed with a  downgrade it was given; and Tanzania 
criticised Moody’s for its decision to assign the country a low credit rating with a negative 
outlook. From 2016, India has made its criticism of the three credit rating agencies known and 
this was amplified in 2017 when India’s chief economic advisor, Arvind Subramanian, alleged 
that credit rating agencies were biased towards countries such as China and against other 
nations and criticised the rating firms methodology as a compromised analysis (Karnik, 2017).
  
Writing for the German international broadcaster, DeustcheWelle (DW), Pelz (2019) notes that 
African countries were beginning to retaliate against the ‘subjective’ ratings.  Pelz (2019) 
quoted the Namibian Finance Minister, Calle Schlettein, who said the rating given to Namibia 
was confusing and puzzling. This was after Namibia was downgraded by Moody’s to Ba1 from 
Baa3. Associate Professor Sean Gossel, who teaches economics at the University of Cape 
Town, was also quoted by Deustche Welle saying “That is part of the criticism, that it isn't a 
very robust analytical process; there is a high degree of subjectivity to it”  and “Much of the 
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criticism is that the personnel making these ratings do not understand the African environment 
and do not understand the challenges that African countries in particular face” (Pelz, 2019). 
On the other hand, studies that dispute the presence of bias against emerging markets such as 
that of Yalta and Yalta (2018) who found that sovereign credit ratings assigned by Moody’s, 
Fitch and Standard & Poor indicate home country bias while they did not find any evidence of 
any bias against countries in the middle and north of Africa. 
These statements by public officials and official communications by the government in 
response to credit rating announcements play a significant role in the financial markets and 
affect economic activity as is  indicated by Atkins and Basu (1995), Rodríguez and Schulstad 
(2004) and Kriwoluzky (2012). 
In light of the debates and controversy around the role played by rating agencies,3 this research 
uses a sample of 27 African countries over the period of 15 years from 2003 to 2018 in order 
to (i) examine the variation of the selected Africa countries’ currency exchange rate in response 
to the sovereign rating announcements; and (ii) establish whether sovereign credit rating 









Figure 2a: Fitch, Moody’s and S&P rating actions on emerging markets and 
governments  
 
3 As articulated by Ferri (2004), Frost (2007), Gaillard (2009) Sinclair (2010) De Haan and Amtenbrink(2011), 
Eijffinger (2012), Zheng (2012), Bayar (2014), Vernazza and Nielsen (2015) Tennant and Tracey (2016) and 
Duygun, Huseyin and Mohamed (2016). 
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Figure 2b: Africa’s sovereign credit rating distribution 
(Sources: African Peer Review Mechanism; Mutize, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 2c: Africa’s upgrades and downgrades trend 




1.3. Foreign Exchange Regimes of Selected Countries 
1.3.1. The Common Monetary Area 
South Africa, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia form the Common Monetary Area which is 
effectively a monetary union with the South African Rand being a legal tender in all these 
countries. Even though the other countries issue their own respective currencies, they are on 
par with the South African Rand. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has intervened in 
the foreign exchange market since the 1960s. The Bank has often maintained a large net open 
forward position whereby the Bank’s forward US dollar liabilities exceed its forward dollar 
assets. The official objective of this policy is to absorb speculative pressures on the Rand, 
preventing sharp depreciations and mitigating the increases in the interest rate. The objective is 
not to defend a predetermined value of the Rand but to ease the (market-driven) adjustment of 
the exchange rate. The experiences of the 1990s suggest that the effectiveness of the SARB’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in dampening pressures on the exchange rate was 
minimal and short-lived, at best. In contrast, the evidence tends to support the view that a high 
net open forward position leads to a higher risk premium on investment in South Africa, as the 






1.3.2. The CFA franc zone 
The CFA franc zone is made up of two monetary unions, namely, the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union and the Central African Economic and Monetary Union. These two 
monetary unions maintain the same currency, the CFA franc. Fourteen countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa form part of the CFA franc zone by belonging to either the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union or the Central African Economic and Monetary Union. Of these 14 countries, 
only seven form part of this study and these are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo, 
Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal. There are two regional central banks that operate 
independently and issue two separate CFA currencies: the franc de la Communauté Financière 
de l’Afrique and the franc de la Coopération Financière Africaine. Since the two currencies 
have the same parity to the FF, they are equivalent for all practical purposes and the zone is, in 
fact, a common currency area. Any decision to change the parity of the currencies requires the 
unanimous support of all members of the entire zone. The parity of the CFA to the FF was 
established in October 1948 at 0.5 CFA per FF. However, in 1968, the parity was adjusted 
following the introduction of a new FF equivalent to 100 of the old FF. The value of the CFA 
relative to the FF did not change, but its absolute value was raised to 50 CFA per FF. Following 
continued deterioration of economic conditions in the 1980s and early 1990s, the CFA, which 
had been overvalued for years, was finally devaluated by 50% in February 1994. 
The CFA is fully convertible and there is free capital mobility between the two regions and 
France. Full convertibility of the CFA is guaranteed by the French Treasury, rather than the 
Central Bank of France. Therefore, the arrangement is of a budgetary rather than a monetary 
nature. This feature facilitated the shift of the parity from the FF to the Euro at the creation of 
the EMU, as it did not require the approval of other members of the EMU. This shift has left 
the operating structures of the CFA zone and the relationships between the group and France 
fundamentally unchanged. The current fixed rate is 100 CFAF per 0.8385 Euro.  
Under the fixed exchange regime, zone member countries have been able to maintain inflation 
rates that are lower than other comparable sub-Saharan African countries. However, price 
stability was achieved at significant costs. The inability to adjust the exchange rate has resulted 
in higher sensitivity of economic growth to real shocks, especially terms-of-trade fluctuations. 
Most observers conclude that CFA zone countries should rather have flexibility to use exchange 




In 1989, Kenya began the process of liberalisation of the financial system. Interest rate ceilings 
were gradually removed, and interest rates were fully liberalised by 1991. In 1991, the 
liberalisation of current and capital accounts was initiated with the introduction of “foreign 
exchange bearer certificates of deposits”, which could be used in current and capital account 
transactions. These certificates were available for residents and non-residents; they were freely 
traded in the secondary market, and redeemed at the central bank at their face value. Since 1991, 
some companies were allowed to hold foreign currency-denominated bank accounts abroad and 
domestically. Banks were allowed to conduct transactions in foreign exchange directly. 
Forward foreign exchange contracts were allowed at market rates albeit with some restrictions 
on the amount and the term. In the fourth quarter of 1993, the exchange rate regime shifted 
from a currency composite peg to an independently floating regime. In 1994, the Kenyan 
shilling became fully convertible. In 1995, all remaining exchange controls were removed. Also 
removed were restrictions on purchases of shares and government securities by non-residents. 
1.3.4. Egypt 
The exchange rate regime in Egypt experienced significant shifts in the early 1990s. Starting in 
1969, Egypt instituted a system of multiple exchange rates and maintained an “official” parallel 
market to attract workers’ remittances and encourage tourism. The exchange rate policies 
pursued in the 1970s and the 1980s resulted in a substantial appreciation of the Egyptian pound 
and undermined export competitiveness. As part of the reform program, the government 
established a free market for foreign exchange for current account transactions in 1991, and 
eased capital account restrictions further in 1992. The real exchange rate continued to 
appreciate after 1991, partly as a result of appreciation and partly as a result of the differential 
in inflation between Egypt and its trading partners (see Subramanian & Handy, 1997 and 
Mongardini, 1998). However, there is no evidence to suggest that the real appreciation reflected 
the productivity gains. The country did not experience any improvement in trade performance. 
In fact, non-oil exports declined at the end of the decade. The appreciation of the Egyptian 
pound may continue in the future if capital inflows continue. 
1.3.5. Nigeria 
Over the years, Nigeria applied a variety of foreign exchange arrangements, including fixed 
official exchange rates, market-determined exchange rates, dual systems of fixed official rates, 
and rates based on interbank exchange (IMF 1998). Before 1986 (the beginning of structural 
adjustment), the official rate was fixed without any link to the market rate or inflation, resulting 
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in a high premium. After 1986, the government pursued a de facto indexation of the official 
exchange rate by adjusting the official exchange rate in response to changes in the parallel 
market to prevent the premium from being too large. The evidence shows that the official and 
parallel exchange rates moved together after 1986 (Azam 1999). With the “abandonment” of 
the adjustment program in 1994, the Nigerian government reinstated – among other controls – 
foreign exchange controls with an artificially fixed exchange rate. However, by the end of 1994, 
it was clear that attempts to stabilise the Naira by administrative means had failed. In 1995, the 
government made a turnaround, resuming the economic liberalisation program. Since then, the 
government has pursued policies aimed at allowing the exchange rates to reflect market 
conditions while using monetary policy to contain pressures on foreign exchange markets. In 
January 1999, the government abolished the official exchange rate (fixed at 22 Naira per dollar 
since 1993), and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) gradually shifted its intervention from a 
weekly allocation of foreign exchange through the Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market 
(AFEM) to exclusive reliance on continuous buying and selling in the Interbank Foreign 
Exchange Market (IFEM). This has eliminated the multiple exchange rates arising from the 
spread between the rates in the two markets. 
1.3.6. Uganda 
The Ugandan government has committed to moving toward liberal foreign exchange and trade 
regimes. In particular, the government committed to not resisting fluctuations in the exchange 
rate due to changes in economic fundamentals. It is committed to supporting liberalisation of 
the foreign exchange regime with appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. Recently the 
Ugandan shilling has been relatively stable compared to the 1980s and early 1990s and 
compared to neighbouring countries (Krichene, 1998). 
1.3.7. Malawi 
Until May 2000, Malawi had actively managed its foreign exchange markets, which resulted in 
a large depreciation of the kwacha as well as severe distortions of economic incentives (IMF, 
2001). The country’s data indicate large depreciations of the kwacha, especially in 1994, in 
1998 (by 40%), and in 2000 (by another 40%). Even in periods of relative stability of the 
exchange rate (between 1994 and 1998), high inflation rates led to substantial real depreciation 
of the currency. May 2000 marked a major policy shift, when the central bank stopped quoting 
an explicit exchange rate and substantially reduced its intervention for exchange rate 
determination purposes, making the exchange rate fully flexible. Since 1995, Malawi has 
moved towards the liberalisation of capital account transactions. For example, non-residents 
 
 16 
are allowed to repatriate investment proceeds without restrictions (only registration for 
statistical purposes is required). 
1.3.8. South Africa 
From the days of apartheid, South Africa inherited and maintained a floating currency regime. 
According to Nowak and Ricci (2006), there are a number of factors that have contributed to 
non-impressive performance of the South Africa Rand against its major trading currencies and 
these factors include: policy directions from the South African Reserve Bank, activities of 
currency speculators, the politics in the country, the unrest and strikes on the labour front, the 
public sector debts and the increasingly erratic weather patterns affecting agricultural exports. 
The Rand has proved to perform well against these major trading currencies when the South 
African economy does well. However, the Rand has been under immense pressure following 
multiple signals by credit rating agencies that they would move to downgrade South Africa’s 
sovereign credit rating.  
1.4. Problem definition 
With the globalisation of financial markets, credit ratings have taken on a more significant role 
in the international allocation and pricing of capital (Reinhart et al., 2002). Reinhart (2002) 
proffers that developed countries take international markets for granted, whereas developing 
countries’ access to international capital markets is precarious and highly variable, and thus 
sovereign credit ratings are critical. In developing markets, capital flows are important for 
portfolio diversification, as well as an essential source of investment (Eraslan, 2017).  With 
capital flows being susceptible to changes in financial indicators, such as exchange rates, 
inflation and interest rates (Kräussl, 2005b), it is vital to investigate the impact that sovereign 
credit ratings have on exchange rates given that Andersen et al. (2002) note that exchange rate 
structures are very responsive to such news. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) posit that currency 
crises in emerging markets highlight the importance of exchange rate behaviour for economic 
stability and attract interest in exchange rate dynamics. Eraslan (2017) posits that emerging 
markets are more sensitive to capital flows due to the nexus between capital flows and financial 
indicators such as exchange rate, inflation and interest rate. Given the central role that credit 
rating agencies play in financial markets, it is therefore necessary to investigate how the 
sovereign credit rating announcement impacts exchange rates in Africa. Between 2003 and 
2018, the number of sovereign credit ratings given to countries in Africa increased, which 
increased the interest in investigating the impact of these sovereign ratings in Africa. Despite 
this long-standing interest in the effects of sovereign credit rating announcements, the focus 
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has been on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on country risk and stock returns. Limited 
studies have investigated the impact of sovereign credit ratings on foreign exchange rates. 
Consequently, the purpose of this study is to investigate the empirical effects that sovereign 
credit rating announcements have on foreign exchange rates in Africa over a period from 2003 
to 2018. 
1.5. Research Objectives and Questions 
1.5.1. Research Questions 
This study investigates the impact of the information provided by credit rating agencies through 
the issuance of sovereign credit ratings on exchange rates in Africa. The quest is to see if the 
sovereign credit rating announcements contain new and material information that influences 
African exchange rate movements. Therefore, the primary research question that this study 
seeks to investigate is: 
Do sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant impact on foreign 
exchange rate returns in Africa? 
Griffin and Sanvincente (1982) posit that credit rating agencies announce a change in a 
sovereign credit rating of a country when it is felt that there is a material and fundamental shift 
in that country’s macroeconomic environment. A positive credit rating therefore implies an 
improvement of the country’s credit risk profile whereas a negative rating implies the 
worsening of the country’s credit risk profile. Therefore, when a credit rating downgrade is 
announced, the market considers it negative information and an upgrade is considered as 
positive information (Mutize, 2017). According to Mateev (2012), a sovereign credit rating 
should lead to either a positive or negative exchange rate reaction. However, since literature on 
this specific study is limited, it is implied therefore that there is little empirical evidence of this 
impact on exchange rates. Goh and Ederington (1993) even argue that sovereign credit rating 
announcements might not have a significant effect on exchange rate movements.  
In order to further examine the implications arising from the primary question, and the 
hypothesis that exchange rates react positively to sovereign credit rating upgrades and 
negatively to sovereign credit rating downgrades, the following sub-questions are explored: 
• Do sovereign credit rating announcements influence excess exchange rate returns? 
• Is there a significant relationship between sovereign credit rating announcements and 
exchange rate movements? 
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• Do sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades affect the exchange rates by the 
same magnitude? 
• Does one country’s sovereign credit rating change cause significant spillover effects on 
other African countries’ exchange rates? 
1.5.2. Objectives 
The goal of this research is to employ an event study analysis to determine the extent to which 
sovereign credit rating announcements impact foreign exchange rates. The result of this 
endeavour will be valuable to the practitioners and professionals in academia and the industry 
to understand the impact of sovereign credit rating on foreign currency exchange rates. 
1.6. Research Hypothesis 
Babin and Zikmund (2015) define a hypothesis as an educated and predictive statement about 
the possible outcome of a scientific research study. The statement should be clear, specific and 
testable by scientific research. 
Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini (2005) argue that a good sovereign credit rating leads to 
an increase in capital flows to emerging markets and consequently results in potential exchange 
rate overshoots as compared to countries with low ratings who find it more costly to repay their 
international debt. Studies by Özatay, Özmen and Sahinbeyoglu (2009) show that negative 
credit rating announcements affect countries with low credit ratings more than countries with 
good ratings. Agreeing with Cavallo, Kisselev, Perri and Roubini (2004), Eraslan (2017) found 
that sovereign credit rating announcements affect some of the emerging markets’ foreign 
exchange rate movements. However, none of these studies concentrated specifically on African 
countries. In order to close the knowledge gaps identified above, this study tests two 
hypotheses, that is, the null hypothesis (H0) and alternative hypothesis (H1) as follows: 
H0: Sovereign credit ratings have no significant impact on foreign currency exchange rate 
returns in Africa 






1.7. Justification of the study 
The study of how sovereign credit ratings impact financial markets is relatively new, with most 
studies focusing on how sovereign credit ratings affect bond yields and stock markets as target 
variables. Fewer studies have been conducted to show the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
exchange rates. Surges in capital inflows have positive effects on the real economy and the 
relationship between exchange rates and capital flows has been established by Kodongo and 
Ojah (2013). It is therefore equally important to investigate factors that influence exchange 
rates. While research has been conducted on how financial indicators, such as exchange rate, 
interest rate and inflation, influence exchange rates and consequently capital flow, there is little 
research on how sovereign credit rating announcements impact exchange rates in Africa. This 
study aims to close that gap in the literature. 
This study firstly adds to the theoretical understanding of the significance of sovereign credit 
rating and outlook news on the foreign exchange rates by looking at the performance of the 
African currencies’ returns and volatility around the time of those pronouncements. Secondly, 
it is important to understand the behaviour of exchange rates in response to sovereign credit 
rating announcements since, according to Kodongo and Ojah (2013), classical economists 
believe that foreign exchange rate changes drive private investment flow. Therefore, this study 
provides valuable information for international investors and managers of international 
portfolios. Managers and investors are facing a wave of information relating to the risk of 
investing in foreign nations, often turning to sovereign credit ratings as a country risk indicator. 
Engle et al. (2012) and Gallo and Velucchi (2012) note that, when investors are faced with 
increased volatility in their country’s stock markets, they naturally reduce their positions due 
to the increased risk. According to Twin (2019), exchange rates impact the real return of an 
investor's portfolio, albeit  on a relatively smaller scale. Thirdly, a comprehensive 
understanding of the effects of rating changes on foreign exchange rates will improve the 
foreign exchange rate policy. If ratings affect foreign exchange rates, then they can exacerbate 
and prolong financial crises. Policies should, therefore, address this possibility, additionally 
factoring in potential contagion from other financial market downgrades and upgrades. 
According to Munro (2015), examining exchange rate reactions to sovereign credit ratings is 
vital in understanding cross-border financial linkages. Furthermore, an understanding of 
spillovers across emerging markets and within regions can be used, not only reactively but 




1.8. Organisation of the Study 
The study will consist of five chapters, and the synopsis of the chapters is as follows: 
Chapter One details a general introduction and overview of the thesis. Objectives, hypothesis 
and main research questions will be outlined as well as highlighting the purpose and 
significance of the dissertation. 
Chapter Two reviews the literature on the behaviour of exchange rates and the effects of 
sovereign credit ratings as well as how this investigation adds to the body of knowledge by 
addressing a gap in the existing literature. 
Chapter Three details the methods and techniques employed in this study as well as the 
justification of such methods thereby acknowledging the methods’ strengths and limitations. 
Chapter Four discusses the findings by reporting the outcome of testing the null and the 
alternative hypotheses. 
Chapter Five consists of a conclusion and recommendations linking outcomes in Chapter Four 
to the literature in order to show how the findings corroborate or disapprove previous research 
findings. A summary of the main findings will be included in this chapter as well as limitations 
of the study and how they may be addressed in future research. Lastly, the implications of the 





LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1. Introduction 
This literature review considers the theoretical and empirical studies on sovereign credit ratings 
and their impact on exchange rates. The review is divided into six sub-sections that discuss the 
theoretical studies that explore the relationship between SCRs and exchange rates before 
moving on to detail the empirical studies that investigated the associations on a cross country 
basis. Thereafter, the studies that have considered the dynamics in developed countries, 
developing countries studies, and in Africa, are discussed. A summary concludes each 
subsection then culminates in a conclusion of the literature at the end of this chapter. 
2.2. Theoretical framework: Sovereign credit ratings and exchange rates 
This section reviews the theoretical studies that highlight and examine the behaviour of 
exchange rates. There are theories that seek to explain the behaviour of exchange rates. This 
study focuses on these theories and proposes how sovereign credit ratings come into the mix.  
To examine the impact of sovereign credit rating on exchange rates in Africa, this review of the 
literature first explores the theoretical areas that explain the nature and responsiveness of 
exchange rates. Exchange rates are one of the most important macroeconomic indicators 
because changes in the value of a country’s currency affect trade and capital flows. Foreign 
exchange rates are dependent on the supply and demand of currencies connected with 
international trade and capital flows. They are susceptible to speculation, and government and 
central bank interventions (Staszczak, 2015). Classical economists believe that exchange rate 
changes drive international private investment flows. 
2.2.1. Balance of payments approach 
In theory, the balance of payments approach seeks to explain the relationship between 
international trade and capital flows, on the one hand, and foreign exchange rates. The balance 
of payments approach, which rests on the flow concept, postulates that financial markets are 
equilibrated only “in the margin” so that the exchange rate is determined to equilibrate the flow 
supply of (demand for) foreign exchange from a current account surplus (deficit) with the net 
desired additions (subtractions) of foreign assets by holders of financial assets (Krueger, 1969). 
Under the balance of payments approach, the amount that domestic residents spend on imports 
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determines the demand for foreign exchange. Conversely, the amount that foreign residents 
spend on domestic exports determines the supply of foreign exchange (Kodongo & Ojah, 2013). 
Therefore, in the short run, the country’s balance of payments improves when there is a 
devaluation of that country’s currency resulting in a reduction in the price of exports and 
domestic capital assets and an increase in the price of imports and foreign capital assets.  
2.2.2. The portfolio balance model 
On the other hand, there is the portfolio balance model that is espoused by monetary economists 
which contends that the exchange rate is one of the prices that equilibrate the international 
markets for various assets (Kodongo & Ojah, 2013). According to Frenkel, (1976) what should 
be considered is stock rather than flow when considering monies for the purpose of determining 
the exchange rate. The portfolio balance model adds that the critical equilibrium condition is 
the requirement that the demand for the stock of each national money must equal the stock of 
that money available to be held; flows of funds occur in order to correct existing monetary 
disequilibria or to prevent new disequilibria from emerging (Mussa, 1976). Accordingly, under 
the assumptions of the portfolio balance model, the argument that capital flows are expected to 
lead exchange rates, with a negative correlation if exchange rates are directly quoted, can be 
advanced.  
2.2.3. The classical economist theory 
Classical economists, on the other hand, believe that private investment flows are driven by 
foreign exchange rate changes. Ojah and Kodongo (2013), highlight the two reasons to believe 
that the devaluation of the domestic currency would affect the inflow of international private 
investments. Firstly, devaluation eliminates the impending threat of a change in the exchange 
rate when a currency is obviously overvalued. Secondly, devaluation, insofar as it improves the 
foreign exchange position, makes possible a more liberal trade and foreign exchange policy and 
encourages foreign investments because it makes amortisation and profit remittances relatively 
freer. These views point to a unidirectional causality in which foreign exchange rate changes 
drive the flow of cross-border trade and capital flows with a positive correlation. However, it 
is important to note that the direction of causality between exchange rates and capital flows has 
not been resolved in the literature. These theories attempt to explain exchange rate behaviour 
and similarly this study attempts to find out whether exchange rate behaviour is influenced by 
sovereign credit rating announcements in Africa. 
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2.3. The role of credit rating agencies 
Credit rating agencies play a significant role in financial markets. Millon and Thakor (1985) 
posit that there are three ways in which credit rating agencies add value to financial markets, 
through the provisions of information, certification, and monitoring. Under the informational 
theory, they theorise that the information gathering causes information asymmetries and moral 
hazards. The authors contend that credit rating agencies help to reduce the cost of information, 
which, in turn, increases the number of potential borrowers and consequently promotes market 
liquidity. Agreeing with Millon and Thakor (1985), Cantor and Packer (1996) find that 
sovereign credit ratings announcements summarise and supplement information contained in 
macroeconomic indicators. Pukthuanthong-Le, Elayan, & Rose (2007) and Elkhoury (2008) 
support this narrative by advancing that credit rating agencies provide financial markets with 
new tradable information and therefore help to reduce informational asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers about the creditworthiness of the latter who are corporates and 
sovereigns. 
As depicted by their credit watch announcements, the monitoring role of credit rating agencies 
is also highlighted in the literature. Kiff, Nowak, Schumacher and Sylwia (2012) posit that a 
credit watch acts as an implicit contract between the borrower and the credit rating agencies 
where the former commits to undertake explicit actions to mitigate the potential deterioration 
of its credit standing and rating facilitated by the monitoring regime put in place by the credit 
rating agencies. Along with the information and monitoring theories, credit rating agencies also 
classify securities as either investment or non-investment grades, therefore fulfilling their 
certification services. Kiff et al. (2012) suggest that sovereign credit ratings applied to securities 
impacts demand and market liquidity and thus acts as a trigger in investment decision making 
and regulatory oversight. 
Elkhoury (2008) advances that credit rating agencies provide financial markets with new 
tradable information and therefore help to reduce informational asymmetry. The presence of 
informational asymmetry may lead to rational or irrational behaviour which is used to explain 
the relationship between countries when economic fundamentals and contagion shocks fail to 
explain such relationship (Gavriilidis, Kallinterakis, and Ferreira 2013). Herding behaviour 
results when almost all individual investors have private information that is not publicly shared 
and want to utilise that information to make abnormal returns. Alternatively, when information 
is costly to obtain, it means that not all investors would have access to relevant information 
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required to be informed (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Thus, less-informed investors usually 
choose to follow the action of informed market leaders, which causes markets across borders 
to move together. 
In summary, the existing literature suggests that credit rating agencies add value to markets. By 
extension, the importance and significance of sovereign credit ratings are vital for economies, 
especially emerging ones, to attract investments in the form of capital flows. According to 
Millon and Thakor (1985), credit rating agencies add value to financial markets through the 
provisions of information, certification, and monitoring. Credit rating agencies, through 
sovereign credit rating announcements, bring new tradable information to the market thereby 
reducing informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Due to asymmetric 
information, investors are expected to behave rationally or irrationally, usually based on 
observing other investors. This phenomenon usually causes significant withdrawals as a result 
of herding when there is an economic run triggered by a few investors divesting. The next 
section thus considers empirical cross-country literature. 
2.4. Empirical cross-country studies 
This section discusses existing empirical cross-country studies that have been undertaken to 
investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements. The study of how sovereign 
credit ratings impact financial markets is relatively new with most studies focusing on how 
sovereign credit ratings affect bond yields and stock markets while fewer studies have been 
conducted to show the impact of sovereign credit ratings on foreign exchange rates.  
With regards to cross country studies of both developed and emerging countries, Cantor and 
Packer (1996) show the determinants of sovereign debt ratings using a multiple regression 
covering 49 countries using their sovereign credit rating of September 1995. Their results reveal 
that rating variations across countries cannot be explained by quantitative models only but by 
other determinants such as qualitative social and political factors. Additionally, they find that 
sovereign rating announcements cause significant cross-country spillover effects on financial 
markets. Hence, they conclude that macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, gross domestic 
product per capita and foreign debt level, explain sovereign debt rating changes.  
Using data from advanced and emerging economies, Cantor and Manor (1996) investigate the 
determinants of sovereign credit ratings using an event study of 49 advanced and emerging 
countries as of September 1995. The results indicate that CRA opinions independently affect 
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market spreads with a single rating accounting for 92% of the variation in spreads, especially 
economies that are below the investment grade. Also, the impact of one CRA announcement is 
more significant if it confirms the announcement of another CRA or a previous announcement. 
Cantor and Manor thus conclude that, despite sovereign credit ratings having a significant 
predictable component, they provide new information to the market that is not readily available 
on the public domain.  
Reinhart (2002) posits that currency crises are usually preceded by credit rating downgrades 
and that instability increases default risks. Using the signals approach, covering the period from 
1970 to 1999, Reinhart (2002) finds that a currency crisis leads to an increased likelihood of a 
sovereign credit rating collapse which, in turn, leads to a loss of access to international credit 
by the affected country. He argues that, since much of the emerging markets debt is 
denominated in US dollars, emerging markets’ currency devaluations have a significant impact 
on the countries’ balance sheets and thus credit ratings are more reactive than predictive in 
emerging markets. 
Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002) use panel regressions and perform event studies to 
investigate the spillover effects using data from 16 emerging markets over the period from 1990 
to 2000. The results show that changes in sovereign credit ratings directly affect financial 
markets of countries rated and trigger contagious fluctuations in neighbouring countries. 
Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002) thus conclude that rating and outlook changes significantly 
affect bond and stock markets, with ratings having a more significant impact than outlooks. The 
results also support Cantor and Packer’s (1996) finding that sovereign credit rating changes in 
one emerging market trigger spillover changes in bond yield spreads and stock returns in other 
developing markets. 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) use event studies to examine equity and debt market responses 
to sovereign credit ratings announcements in 34 countries, covering the period 1990–2000. 
They find that equity return responses to a downgrade are more pronounced in the cases of high 
inflation and low fiscal debt, and on bond returns. Also, the response of the markets to a 
downgrade is more pronounced when the economy is ailing. Therefore, the authors conclude 
that downgrading has a significant impact on equity and bond returns and that the sovereign 
credit rating announcements are asymmetric. This conclusion agrees with Kräussl (2003), who 




More recently, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on exchange rates using an event study on developed and emerging markets 
over a period spanning from 1994 to 2010. They find evidence that both positive and negative 
credit news has a significant impact on the own-country exchange rate and other countries’ 
exchange rates, which agrees with Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002). The authors find that the 
response to sovereign credit rating announcement is asymmetric but contributes significantly 
to exchange rate contagion in Europe and Central Asia. Alsakka and ap Gwilym further find 
that negative rating results in stronger market reactions than positive ratings and that the impact 
of sovereign credit rating signals differs in emerging markets versus developed markets. They 
thus conclude that downgrades and positive outlooks are only significant in emerging markets 
whereas, in developed markets, only upgrades and negative outlooks are significant. 
Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) use a multiple regression analysis of intraday market data and 
sovereign credit ratings data of nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region over a period from 
1997 to 2001 to examine the impact of sovereign credit ratings on both stock and currency 
markets. The results find that currency markets are less responsive to rating news than stock 
markets. They thus conclude that sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant 
impact on financial market stability because market participants consider them essential. 
Concurring with previous studies by Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Brooks, Faff, 
Treepongkaruna and Wu (2015) examine the effects of sovereign credit re-ratings on equity 
markets returns of 36 countries during the period 1996–2013 using event study methodology 
and find that stock market returns are more responsive to sovereign re-ratings during financial 
crises. However, the impact is different across different financial crises. The authors conclude 
that there are asymmetric effects during financial crises. 
Mutize and Gossel (2018) use Granger causality and impulse response tests to investigate the 
effects of sovereign credit rating spillovers on neighbouring countries’ financial markets among 
a sample of 19 African countries over the period from 1994 to 2014. The results show that there 
are marginal regional sovereign credit rating spillover impacts that persisted for more extended 
periods in the sovereign credit rating of other countries in the same region. Mutize and Gossel 
(2018) thus conclude that regional bilateral linkages between countries serve as channels of 
capital and sovereign credit rating information flows. 
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Thus, in summary, the available literature suggests that sovereign credit rating announcements 
impact financial markets, causing significant cross-country spillover effects on financial 
markets. Furthermore, existing literature suggests that currency crises are usually preceded by 
credit rating downgrades and that instability increases default risks. In the African context, 
studies further show that regional bilateral linkages between countries serve as channels of 
capital and sovereign credit rating information flows.  
2.5. Empirical studies of developed countries 
This section discusses the existing empirical studies that have been undertaken to investigate 
the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements in developed countries. Yang and Zhang 
(2011) study the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on foreign exchange rates in 
the Eurozone using the EGARCH model over the period spanning from January 2009 to March 
2011. They find that rating news significantly affects the volatility of the USD/EUR and that 
markets reacted to announcements of large economies and ignored the rating announcements 
of small economies. They thus conclude that, since credit ratings assess the default risk of 
outstanding loans, currency depreciation leads to a more substantial burden for the country to 
repay, which causes higher default risks.  
There are very few studies that have investigated the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
exchange rates and there are no theories that focus specifically on the impact of sovereign credit 
rating announcements of exchange rates. According to Kodongo and Ojah (2013), a devaluation 
of the domestic currency eliminates the threat of a change in the exchange rate when a currency 
is overvalued, and devaluation provides conducive conditions for a more liberal trade and 
foreign exchange policy and encourages investments. Kodongo and Ojah (2013) point out that 
this approach suggests a unidirectional causality where cross-border trade and capital flows are 
driven by foreign exchange rate changes with many African countries enacting policies that 
ensured the change in exchange rate regimes by adopting varying degrees of the flexible 
exchange rate regimes. Kodongo and Ojah (2013) postulate that, when exchange rates are not 
fixed, they respond to cross-border trade and investment activities as well as being responsive 
to new information that is introduced to the market. However, the response to new information 
will depend on the levels of informational asymmetry prevailing in the market. Consequently, 
changes in exchange rates influence perceptions about the risks of foreign investments therefore 




Fatnassi et al. (2014) use regression analysis to investigate the reactions of returns of four 
European stock markets to changes in sovereign credit ratings during the period 2000–2012. 
Fatnassi et al. (2014) find that sovereign credit rating upgrades and downgrades affect both 
own country and other countries’ returns and that the impacts of downgrades on markets are 
more pronounced and significant during periods of debt crises. This agrees with Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002), who find that sovereign credit ratings have a pronounced impact on both 
domestic and foreign markets during crises. Fatnassi et al. (2002) also find that negative 
announcements are more significant in terms of their impact as compared to positive news. 
They thus conclude that sovereign credit rating signals have an impact on stock market returns 
and contribute to contagion, which accords with Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007), and Alsakka and 
ap Gwilym (2012). 
Kang and Min (2016) investigate the effect of sovereign credit ratings in East Asian countries 
using panel vector autoregression over the period spanning from 2000 to 2013. The findings 
provide evidence that sovereign credit rating upgrades and positive outlooks have stronger 
effects than downgrades and negative outlooks, and there are spillover effects where the 
economic variables of one country are affected by outlooks of another, thereby supporting 
Cantor and Packer (1996) and Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002). Kang and Min thus conclude 
that, despite the criticisms of the credit rating agencies, ratings and outlooks provide new 
information to capital markets. However, King and Min (2016) argue that the evidence of the 
contagion effect shows that ratings and outlooks do not provide enough information regarding 
the creditworthiness of countries. 
Baum, Karpava, Schaefer and Stephan (2016) use an event study combined with GARCH 
models to examine the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on the value of the 
Euro and the yields of French, Italian, German and Spanish sovereign bonds during the 
Eurozone debt crisis period of 2011–2012 among 17 countries in Europe. They find that the 
CRA downgrade negatively impacted the value of the Euro and increased its volatility while 
increasing the yields of the other four currencies. The authors conclude that sovereign credit 
rating announcements influenced crisis-time reallocation of capital in Europe with investors 
taking their money out of troubled states and investing in more stable nations. 
Hu (2017) uses regression analysis to study the impact of sovereign credit rating changes on 
domestic banks’ stock returns using data from 150 listed banks in 17 countries in Europe over 
a period of 2004–2013. The results agree with previous studies on the impact of sovereign credit 
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rating announcements that positive sovereign credit rating announcements do not have a 
significant impact, while negative announcements lead to adverse reactions in the prices of 
bank stocks. The author concludes that positive sovereign credit ratings do not cause significant 
bank stock responses, while negative announcements lead to negative share valuations of 
domestic bank stock. 
More recently, Masood, Bashir and Sahi (2017) use regression analysis to investigate the impact 
of sovereign credit ratings on financial markets using data from Greece and Ireland from March 
2008 to December 2015. They find that, during the European debt crisis of 2009, sovereign 
credit ratings were negatively correlated with bond yields in both Greece and Ireland and 
confirm that negative rating announcements bring about high bond spreads and low bond 
spreads in cases of positive rating announcements. They thus conclude that sovereign credit 
ratings have a significant influence on financial markets during crisis periods agreeing with 
earlier studies by Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012). 
Thus, in summary, for most African countries, the liberalisation of foreign exchange markets 
meant dropping currency pegs for exchange rates to be flexible or free floating, which was 
intended to bring about an increase in growth, price stability and trade performance but sadly 
this has not been the case. Studies devoted to developed countries find that sovereign credit 
rating announcements have a disproportionate impact on financial markets with a more 
significant effect on large economies than small economies. Also, it has been shown that 
upgrades and positive outlooks have a more significant impact compared to downgrades and 
negative outlooks. Furthermore, it is found that sovereign credit rating signals have an impact 
on stock market returns and contribute to contagion, particularly during crisis periods.  
2.6. Empirical studies of developing countries 
This section discusses existing empirical studies that have been undertaken to investigate the 
impact of sovereign credit rating announcements in developing countries. Empirical studies by 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) find a significant announcement effect when emerging market 
sovereign bonds are put on a review with a negative outlook. On the other hand, the authors 
find that positive announcements are less significant in terms of their impact on sovereign bond 
yield spreads. Reisen and von Maltzan use a combination of Granger causality tests, together 
with an event study methodology to investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on sovereign bond yield spreads and overall financial markets of 26 countries 
over the period 1987–1996. The authors conclude that sovereign credit ratings have the 
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potential to diminish the flow of excessive private capital into the emerging markets by using 
negative rating announcements. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) investigate the impact of sovereign credit ratings on country 
risk and stock returns using data from 16 emerging countries over a period 1990–2000 by 
employing panel regression and event studies. They find that sovereign credit rating changes 
significantly affect bond and stock markets, with outlooks being less critical than ratings. The 
authors conclude that rating changes lead to spillover effects and that sovereign credit ratings 
have a pronounced impact on both domestic and foreign financial markets during crises. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler also conclude that the impact of sovereign credit rating changes is 
more pronounced in non-transparent economies than in transparent ones. 
In contrast to the results from the previous studies of the impact of sovereign credit ratings on 
financial markets, Kräussl (2003) studies the role of credit rating agencies during a financial 
crisis to examine whether they add to the dynamics of emerging market crises. Kräussl (2003) 
achieves this by investigating how the US dollar bond yield spreads react to an unexpected 
change in sovereign credit rating from 20 countries over the period 1992 to 2000 using a vector 
autoregressive method. Empirical results from the investigation suggest that, during the Asian 
crisis of 1997–1998, the sharp sovereign credit rating downgrade of South Korea had an 
insignificant effect on its short-term liquidity position. The author concludes that a rapid 
downgrade does not necessarily intensify a financial crisis in emerging markets.  
Chiang, Jeon and Li (2007) investigate the dynamic correlation of financial contagion in nine 
Asian markets over the period of 1990–2003 by using a dynamic conditional correlation model.  
They find that, during the Asian crisis, news about rating changes in domestic and foreign 
financial markets increased in contagion and herding. They thus conclude that credit rating 
agencies and investors play a significant role in shaping the structure of dynamic correlations 
in the Asian markets. 
Kräussl (2005a) uses event studies to investigate whether sovereign credit ratings have an 
impact on financial stability in 28 emerging economies over the period 1997–2000. The results 
show that rating changes negatively affect exchange rates and that adverse events have a 
stronger effect than positive events. Additionally, Kräussl (2003) also finds that sovereign 
credit ratings have a lesser impact on financial markets in emerging economies as compared to 
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developed economies. Hence, these results imply that credit rating agencies have a significant 
influence on the magnitude and volatility of capital flows to emerging markets. 
Kim and Wu (2008) use a panel data estimation framework to investigate the impact of 
sovereign credit ratings on domestic financial sector development and international capital 
flows into emerging countries using data from 51 emerging countries over the period 1995–
2003. They find that long term sovereign credit ratings are essential to encourage capital flows 
and financial intermediary. On the other hand, the long-term domestic currency ratings 
discourage international capital flows but stimulate local market growth. Short-term ratings are 
found to retard and stunt the growth and development of financial development and capitals 
flows. The authors thus conclude that long-term ratings are most important for the development 
of financial sectors within emerging markets. 
Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) make use of a fixed effects panel regression to study the nexus 
between sovereign credit ratings and spreads in emerging markets by using data from 35 
countries over the period 1997–2010. They find that an upgrade within the investment grade 
class reduces spreads by 5–10% but has no impact on the classes below investment-grade. 
Jaramillo and Tejada (2011) conclude that an investment-grade status significantly reduces 
financing costs and improves expectations and liquidity in the market by encouraging increased 
inflows from an extensive and diversified investor base. 
Christopher, Kim and Wu (2012) use a bivariate GARCH model and a three-stage correlation 
estimation to examine whether sovereign credit ratings influence regional stock and bond 
market interdependencies in emerging markets using data from 19 countries over a period from 
1994 to 2007. They find that downward ratings and revisions of outlooks lead to an increase in 
diversification potential in regional stock portfolios. In contrast, downgrades lead to reduced 
opportunities for diversification in regional bond portfolios. The authors also find that the 
negative ratings impact is more pronounced in countries with higher foreign currency debt 
ratings. They thus conclude that sovereign credit rating announcements cause heterogeneous 
responses to stock and bond market co-movements within a region and find evidence of positive 
rating spillover effects. Sovereign credit rating upgrades lead to positive benefits to countries 
in the region, agreeing with earlier findings on contagion effects of sovereign credit ratings by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). 
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Using Granger causality tests, Treepongkaruna and Wu (2012) investigate the impact of 
sovereign credit ratings announcements on stock and currency market volatilities and cross-
asset correlations during the periods of financial crisis using data from nine countries over the 
period 1997–2001. Similar to Christopher, Kim and Wu (2012), Treepongkaruna and Wu 
(2012) find that sovereign credit rating announcements cause heterogeneous reactions to 
currency and stock markets with stock markets being more impacted by the announcements 
than the currency markets. They conclude that market participants take heed of sovereign credit 
rating announcements which has a significant impact on the stability of financial markets but 
that the impact differs in magnitude across asset markets and during periods of financial crises. 
Event studies conducted by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) to investigate the impact of 
sovereign credit rating signals on foreign exchange spot markets in 112 countries over the 
period 1994–2010. The authors find that sovereign credit rating announcements affect both 
domestic exchange rates and other countries’ exchange rates in agreement with earlier studies 
by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Christopher, Kim and Wu (2012). However, in 
contrast to Kräussl (2005a), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) find that the market responses to 
sovereign credit rating events are more pronounced in emerging markets as compared to 
developed countries. The impact of sovereign credit rating changes is found to be more 
pronounced in non-transparent economies than in transparent ones. 
Caporale et al. (2017) use a VAR-GARCH model to examine the nexus between macro-news 
and exchange rates in the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping over 
the period from 2000 to 2013. They find that the results differ across countries, but there is 
evidence of significant spillover effects whose strength appeared to increase during the crisis. 
Caporale et al. (2017) thus conclude that the empirical evidence confirms that news plays a 
vital role in developed economies and BRICs countries.  
Kang and Min (2016) use panel vector autoregression to study the impact of sovereign credit 
ratings on the economies of seven East Asian countries. They find evidence to suggest that 
rating upgrades and positive outlooks have stronger impacts than rating downgrades and 
negative outlooks, and that the impact of positive outlooks and ratings are higher after the 
financial crisis. The authors conclude that outlooks and ratings provide new tradable 




Eraslan (2017) studies the impacts of sovereign credit rating announcements on exchange rates 
of 11 emerging market economies using a multivariate DCC-GARCH approach over a period 
2002 to 2015. The results find that, although sovereign credit rating announcements affect 
exchange rates, they have a more significant impact in countries that have a high amount of 
foreign debt, large account deficit and are ranked in the speculative-grade rating. Eraslan (2017) 
thus concludes that investors may rebalance their portfolios just before sovereign credit rating 
announcements which may lead to exchange rate volatilities in emerging economies. 
Thus, in summary, the literature in this section shows that sovereign credit rating 
announcements have the potential to diminish the flow of excessive private capital into the 
emerging markets therefore significantly reducing financing costs. Also, an investment-grade 
status improves expectations and liquidity in the market by encouraging greater inflows from a 
wide and diversified investor base. In addition, the impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements on exchange rates in the emerging markets is shown to be more pronounced in 
countries with a high amount of foreign debt. Sovereign credit rating announcements could 
potentially impact the stability of financial markets, particularly during periods of financial 
crises when there are significant spillovers and contagion effects in the developing economies 
as a result of financial linkages. 
2.7. Empirical studies of Africa 
This section discusses the recent empirical studies that have been undertaken to investigate the 
impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on markets in Africa. Many African countries 
have liberalised their foreign exchange markets and moved away from soft pegs towards 
independently floating or managed floating exchange rate regimes (see Figure 1 above). 
However, these transitions have been asymmetric. While countries have moved out of the 
middle of the exchange regime spectrum, there has been virtually no movement out of or into 
the category of hard-peg regimes. Out of 27 African countries in this study, 52% were classified 
as having soft peg regimes in 2003. In 2008, only 18% of the countries were in this category. 
 
Exchange rate regime transitions in Africa have mostly consisted of a movement of countries 
out of the soft pegs category (especially “conventional fixed pegs”) into independent floats. 
The transition matrix in Figure 1 indicates that over 52% of the countries (14 out of 27 
countries) that were in the soft peg category in 2003 had adopted an independent floating regime 
by 2008. In contrast, no shifts – with a single exception of Namibia which shifted from a hard 
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peg to a soft peg – occurred among countries in both extremes of the exchange regime spectrum. 
The countries in the hard pegs category in 2003 were older members of the CFA zone – again 
except for Namibia. The existing evidence on African countries is inconclusive as to the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of alternative exchange rate regimes. 
 
Ntswane (2014) investigates the impact of sovereign credit ratings on capital flows and 
financial markets in Africa over a period between 1994 and 2011 using an event study analysis. 
The author finds that the historic investment rate is an essential determinant of capital flows in 
emerging economies. Ntswane (2004) finds that there exists an incentive for a positive rating 
announcement for below investment grade ratings while there is no punishment for a negative 
announcement. 
Mutize and Mugobo (2016) use event study methodology to examine the impact of sovereign 
credit rating downgrades on FDI in South Africa over the period 2004–2014. The results show 
that there is a significant relationship between sovereign credit rating downgrades and FDI. 
However, investors’ decisions also consider other factors such as movements in global markets, 
political comments and announcement of the government’s policy. Mutize and Mugobo (2016)  
thus conclude that is it important for emerging countries’ governments to focus on those other 
factors, including those that contribute to a sovereign credit rating change. This conclusion is 
in agreement with Cantor and Packer (1996) who argue that, over and above quantitative 
models, qualitative social and political considerations are also important determinants.  
Mutize and Gossel (2018a) investigate the effects of sovereign credit rating spillovers on 
neighbouring countries’ financial markets of 19 African countries over the period 1994–2014 
using Granger causality and impulse response analysis. The results show that there are regional 
sovereign rating spillover effects in capital markets trading long-term securities, which may be 
an outcome of increased financial integration. Consequently, Mutize and Gossel (2018a) posit 
that investors consider regional credit rating profiles rather than on an individual country basis. 
They therefore conclude that regional economies need to craft and implement developmental 
macroeconomic policies to avoid negative ratings that will have regional spillover effects. This 
supports the findings in earlier studies by Cantor and Packer (1996), Kaminsky and Schmukler 




Mutize and Gossel (2018b) use a combination of  GARCH models and event study techniques 
to examine the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on bond and equity returns of 
30 African countries over the period 1994–2014. They find that financial markets do not react 
significantly to sovereign credit rating announcements. However, since most African countries 
are rated below investment grade, they are thus considered too risky for short-term investments, 
and therefore only attract passive and long-term capital that is less sensitive to sovereign credit 
rating announcements. Mutize and Gossel  (2018b) conclude that, instead of assisting, CRA 
may be contributing to the volatility in financial markets of developing countries. This 
conclusion agrees with earlier studies by Kräussl (2005a), who concludes that credit rating 
agencies have a substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets’ lending. 
There are not many studies that focus on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on exchange 
rates of African economies. Eraslan (2017) investigates the impact of sovereign credit rating 
on the emerging markets exchange rate however South Africa is the only African country 
included in that investigation.  This study therefore fills in that gap by using a sample of 27 
African countries in the investigation of the impact of sovereign credit ratings on exchange 
rates. 
Thus, in summary, there are conflicting results from various studies conducted on the African 
continent with regards to the impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial markets. Some 
studies find that sovereign credit rating announcements affect the exchange rate and spill over 
to other countries, particularly during crisis periods, as a result of regional bilateral linkages. 
However, other studies report that there is no significant financial market response to sovereign 
credit rating announcements. Instead, these studies find that historic investment rate is more 
important, which indicates that, while there is an incentive for a positive rating announcement 
for below investment grade ratings, there is no punishment for a negative announcement.  
2.8. Conclusion 
The results show that, while credit rating agencies add value to markets, sovereign credit rating 
announcements can cause significant cross-country spillover effects and that credit rating 
downgrades usually precede currency crises. Studies devoted to developed countries find that 
sovereign credit rating announcements have a disproportionate impact on financial markets 
with a more significant impact in large economies than small economies. With regards to 
emerging countries, sovereign credit rating announcements have the potential to diminish the 
flow of excessive private capital into the emerging markets because investment-grade status 
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significantly reduces financing costs and improves expectations and liquidity in the market by 
encouraging greater inflows from a wide and diversified investor base. In addition, the impact 
of sovereign credit rating announcements on exchange rates in the emerging markets is shown 
to be more pronounced in countries with a high amount of foreign debt, and thus could 
potentially impact the stability of financial markets, particularly during periods of financial 
crises when there are significant spillovers and contagion effects in the developing economies 
as a result of financial linkages.  
In the African context, there are conflicting results from various studies conducted on the 
African continent with regards to the impact of sovereign credit ratings on financial markets. 
Some studies find that sovereign credit rating announcements affect the exchange rate and spill 
over to other countries, particularly during crisis periods, as a result of regional bilateral 
linkages. However, other studies report that there is no significant financial market response to 
sovereign credit rating announcements. These studies find that the historic investment rate is 
more important, which indicates that, while there is an incentive for a positive rating 








3.1.  Introduction 
This study investigates the impact of sovereign credit ratings on exchange rate returns in 27 
African economies using an event study approach covering the period from 2003 to 2018. 
Previous studies focusing on the impact of sovereign credit ratings on markets use mainly three 
econometric methodologies, namely, the generalised autoregressive conditionally 
heteroskedastic model (GARCH Model), regression analysis and event studies. Yang and 
Zhang (2011), Baum, Karpava, Schaefer and Andreas (2016), and Eraslan (2017) use GARCH 
models while Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Brooks, Faff and Treepongkaruna (2015), 
Vernazza and Nielsen (2015),  Masood, Bashir and Al (2017), and Demoussis, Drakos and 
Giannapoulos (2017) use regression analysis to investigate the impact of sovereign credit 
ratings. Reisen and Von Maltzan (1998), Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2011), Mateev (2012), 
Ntswane (2014), Mutize and Mugobo (2016), Mutize (2017), and Mutize and Gossel (2018b) 
use a combination of event studies and Granger causality tests. Of all econometric models used 
to study the impact of events on the price of stocks or on exchange rates, event studies dominate 
empirical research. 
This study, therefore, employs the use of event study methodology and Granger causality tests 
as well as impulse response function. An event study is one of the most important 
methodological approaches for market based empirical research on finance and accounting 
(Bowman, 1983). Binder (1998) posits that event study methodology has become a standard 
method of measuring security price reactions to an announcement or event which makes it the 
most appropriate methodology to use in this study to investigate exchange rate reactions to 








Figure 3: Prices around announcement date under efficient market hypothesis 
(Source: Kothari & Warner, 2006) 
 
Event study methodology has been used widely in finance, economics and accounting to 
evaluate the impact of a major corporate announcement on the price of stock (Siegel & Teoh, 
1999). The underlying assumption is that the market processes new information about an event 
in an efficient and unbiased manner. Therefore, on event date, when new information is fed into 
the market, an overreaction or an under-reaction in terms of prices can be observed. These new 
events can be voluntary corporate announcements or announcements by regulatory bodies, 
competitors or credit rating agencies. These new events or announcements are presumed to 
bring new information to the market. 
The event study method measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a security 
(MacKinlay, 1997) by measuring the abnormal returns. According to MacKinlay (1997), there 
are five steps to performing event studies: 
i. Identify the precise date of the event of interest. 
ii. Define the event window around the event.  
iii. Measure abnormal reactions during the event window. 
iv. Run a cross-sectional regression of the abnormal reactions on characteristics of interest 
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to determine the source of the reactions. 
v. Present the empirical results and arrive at conclusions.  
3.2.  Research Approach 
To examine the response of exchange rates to the sovereign credit rating announcements 
(defined as an event in this study), this study employs an event study methodology using both 
univariate and multivariate analysis in accordance with previous studies by Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (1999), and Mutize and Gossel (2018b). The study examines whether exchange rates 
display abnormal returns over and above their expected return before and after a sovereign 
credit rating announcement. 
In keeping with MacKinlay (1997), there is no standard or prescribed window period, and it is 
up to the researcher to choose an appropriate one. Therefore, this study defines a window to be 
21 days in accordance with Mutize and Gossel (2018b). The 21 days are split into 10 days 
before the event, 10 days after the event and one day as the event day. Choosing a shorter 
window may compromise the results since most of the African countries’ financial markets are 
small and illiquid; thus, the full impact of the sovereign credit rating announcement may not be 
captured (Ntswane, 2014). 
3.3.  Estimation Strategy 
The primary research method for this study is to subject the daily exchange rates to the event 
study analysis around the time of different sovereign credit rating pronouncements. Firstly, the 
data of all the 27 countries which have received sovereign credit ratings from 2003 to 2018 is 
taken. Then the daily foreign exchange rate of each of the 27 countries is taken for the period 
of 15 years. From the above data, the actual return of each daily foreign exchange rate is 
calculated.  
The empirical steps that will be used to conduct the analysis consist of the following: 
i. Compute exchange rate expected returns in accordance with models presented 
by Brown and Warner (1980). 
ii. Use the Mean Adjusted Return Model in accordance with Brown and Warner (1980) to 
compute the average return over the 50 days preceding the sovereign credit rating even 
window to act as a benchmark representing normal returns. 
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iii. Compute the abnormal reaction. Bowman (1983) posits that this step generally entails 
the calculation of residuals from some model of the process generating security returns. 
iv. Organise and group the abnormal returns by summing average abnormal returns which 
must be summoned to the window period. 
v. Analyse the results by performing Granger Causality tests when possible. 
3.4.  Research design 
3.4.1.  Tests for stationarity 
The first step taken was to determine whether variables in this study are stationary and 
uncorrelated. Oftentimes financial and economic time series, such as exchange rates, GDP and 
stock prices as well as other macro-economic indicators, exhibit nonstationary behaviour 
(Hlouskova et al., 2005). Any conventional regression methods used with data that exhibit 
trending behaviour would give spurious results (Ventosa-Santaulària, 2009) therefore arriving 
at misleading conclusions. According to Stevans (2012), any trends in the data must then be 
removed so that data are transformed from nonstationary to stationary form – I(0). 
Following the methodology by Stevans (2012) for checking the order of integration of study 
variables, this study employs the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and the Phillips-Perron 
(PP) tests to determine whether the data series contains any unit root or trending characteristics. 
The objective of the non-stationarity test is to investigate the null hypothesis (H0) that the data 
series is non-stationary.  If the resultant probability is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, meaning the data are non-stationary. Conversely, if the probability is less 
than 0.05, then the null hypothesis can be rejected as the data would be stationary. 
 
3.4.2.  Identify the events of interest 
To investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on foreign exchange rate 
returns, this study makes use of an event study to examine the reaction of foreign exchange 
rates during the event window as detailed in Mutize and Gossel (2018). A sovereign credit 
rating announcement is defined as an event and the study examines whether there are resultant 
abnormal returns before and after the sovereign credit rating announcement as compared to the 
expected return. The event of interest is defined as one that results in a flow of information to 
the market and, in this study, these events are sovereign credit ratings. According to Bowman 
(1983), a broad interpretation should be placed on what constitutes an event that could occur 
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once in a calendar year or it could occur a number of times. Sovereign credit ratings, in this 
case, occur a number of times in a calendar year and these are announcements by the big three 
credit rating agencies regarding sovereign credit risk assessments of a subject country. The 
assessment comes in the form of a rating upgrade or downgrade and/or placing a country under 
active assessment through issuing an outlook or watch listing (Ntswane, 2014). All of these are 
considered events for this study.  
3.4.3.  Identify the event window 
Concepts of event time and event window are introduced in event studies (Brown and Warner 
(1980), Bowman (1983) MacKinlay (1997), Ntswane (2014), Eraslan (2017), Mutize (2017)). 
According to Ntswane (2014), the event window is the period of impact brought on by the 
sovereign credit rating announcement whereas the event time refers to the date of the sovereign 
credit rating announcement. It is important to note that an event window will start before the 
event time and continue for a period after the event. This is because the market starts reacting 
to the event before it has happened due to the anticipation of the sovereign credit rating 
announcement. The impact of an event continues after the event as a reaction to the 
announcement. In order to create the event window, a process of standardisation is done where 
the date of announcement is considered “Day 0” (Bowman, 1983). The researcher uses 
statistical analysis to determine the number of days to include in the investigation before and 
after “Day 0” thus forming the event window period for each sovereign credit rating 
announcement. According to Brown and Warner (1980), Bowman (1983), MacKinlay (1997), 
Ntswane (2014), Eraslan (2017) and Mutize (2017), there is no standard window to be used in 
event studies, it is up to the researcher to choose an appropriate window however the researcher 
needs to filter out the noise as financial and capital markets react to more than just credit rating 
announcements. The longer the event window, the more the researcher has to account for 
contamination, which is why Kothari and Warner (2004) advocate for a shorter time period as 
it is more reliable. The authors advocate for an average of a 21-day window as they argue it is 
enough to capture the full effect of the sovereign credit rating announcement while limiting the 
chances of contamination associated with longer time periods. 
Previous event studies utilised varying window periods with Brown and Warner (1980), 
Bowman (1983), MacKinlay (1997), Ntswane (2014), Eraslan (2017) and Mutize (2017) using 
from 21 days to over 190 days to define the event window. In keeping with Kothari and Warner 
(2004), this study uses a period of 21 days split between 10 days before the event, one day as 
the event day and 10 days after the event. 
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3.4.4.  Normal and abnormal reactions to the event 
Choosing a method of estimating the excess return is the third step in conducting an event study 
with three estimation options available, namely, unadjusted or mean adjusted returns, risk 
adjusted returns and risk controlled portfolio returns (Bowman, 1983). For the purposes of the 
study, the mean adjusted return model is used in accordance with MacKinlay (1997). The 
abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the observed return around the event of 
interest and the normal or expected return (Brown & Warner, 1985). The normal return is the 
return that would be expected if the event did not take place. Even though this study investigates 
the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on  exchange rates, it is vital to transform 
the daily exchange rates to returns in order to apply the event study methodology (Mutize 
(2017).  
This study will follow the steps detailed below. The daily  foreign exchange rate returns are 
first transformed into returns by using the equation: 
          (1) 
Where Eit is the foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t, Et-1 is the foreign exchange rate 
for sovereign i at time t-1, and E(Rit) is the expected return on the  foreign exchange rate for 
sovereign i at time t. 
 
The Mean Adjusted Return Model then consists of the following: 
          (2) 
Where E(Ri,t)  is the expected return on the  foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t and 
Rit is the observed return on the  foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t. 
Internationally, there is a benchmark for exchange rates provided by Reuters called the 
WM/Reuters Benchmark rates. The WM/Reuters Benchmark rates are spot and forward foreign 
exchange rates that are used as a benchmark for valuations of portfolios and measurement of 
performance. However, as observed in Ntswane (2014), there is no benchmark market return 
index for the foreign exchange rate for African countries. There are four currency indices that 
come close to being a benchmark. The first one is the Emerging Markets Index (EMBASKET) 
which consists of Chinese Renminbi, Turkish Lira, Mexican Peso, and the South African Rand. 
The second one is the Rand Index (RAIN) which comprises the Japanese Yen, United Kingdom 
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Pound, Chinese Yuan, United States Dollar and the South African Rand. It is clear that these 
two indices are not very useful in this study as both indices have a significant weakness of 
having South Africa as the only African country included in the weighting. The third index, 
MSCI Emerging Markets Currency Index, also suffers from the same defect that, of the 25 
countries weighted, only Morocco, Egypt and South Africa are included.  
To solve this problem, a benchmark market return for Africa, henceforth called the African 
Currency Index, was constructed according to the methodology used in the Sagaci Research 
KFC Index (2020). The KFC Index estimates whether currencies of African countries are 
overvalued or undervalued against the USD by comparing the local currency price of a bucket 
of KFC chicken to its price in the USA (Sagaci Research, 2020).  The Sagaci Research’s KFC 
Index analyses the purchasing power in 20 African countries by using KFC pricing data in those 
African countries to calculate implied foreign exchange rates against the United States dollar 
providing a useful comparison with the actual foreign exchange rates of African countries under 
study as shown below in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: The Sagaci Research KFC Index  





The KFC Index is the most appropriate index given the footprint of KFC on the African 
continent. KFC is the largest international fast-food chain on the continent which makes the 
pricing of its products an ideal metric for comparing the purchasing power of different African 
currencies. The Africa Currency Index, which is tailor made according to the KFC Index, 
represents the normal market return index for the foreign exchange rate for African countries 
for the period under study. This was achieved by using equation 1 to come up with daily market 
returns and averaging the returns of 10 African countries covering all the subregions of Africa, 
namely, Angola (C1), Botswana (C2), Egypt, (C3) Ivory Coast (C4), Kenya (C5), Mauritius (C6), 
Morocco (C7), Nigeria (C8), South Africa (C9) and Tunisia (C10) for the same period under 
study. These countries were chosen on the basis that they form part of the weighting of the 
Sagaci Research KFC Index, that they represent the major economies of Africa with the most 
efficient markets, and they are the most trade competitive, according to Kodongo and Ojah 
(2013). 
The daily Africa Return Index (ARI) is therefore computed as follows:  
         (3) 
Where E(Ri,t) is the expected return on the  foreign exchange rate for sovereign i 
at time t and Rit is the observed return on the  foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t. 
In order to calculate the foreign exchange rate abnormal return, the expected return of each 
foreign exchange rate daily basis is calculated. This expected return has been calculated using 
event study methodology which requires the computation of three types of returns, i.e., the 
expected return, the actual return and the abnormal return. After calculating the expected return, 
the expected return is subtracted from the actual return and from this the abnormal return for 
each exchange rate or the entire 21 days (-10 days to +10 days) is obtained. Similarly, the 
abnormal return for each daily exchange rate for a 21-day period is calculated. The abnormal 
return, therefore, is computed by calculating the difference between the observed foreign 
exchange rate return before and after the sovereign credit rating event and the estimated 
expected return spread as follows:  
 
          (4) 
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the observed return on the foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t, and E(Rit) is the 
expected return on the foreign exchange rate for sovereign i at time t. 
In accordance with MacKinlay (1997), in order to draw inference for the sovereign credit rating 
event, abnormal returns must be aggregated. In order to eliminate the effect of any foreign 
exchange rates on abnormal return, the abnormal returns are averaged over countries on day 
basis, i.e., abnormal returns of individual countries are averaged for each day surrounding the 
selected days and, from this, the averaged abnormal returns for all different periods, i.e., AARt 
is calculated.  
The simple average returns are therefore computed as follows: 
          (5) 
Where AARt is the average abnormal return for sovereign i in period t and n is the number of 
securities in the sample. 
After calculating the average abnormal return, the cumulative average abnormal returns using 
CAAR formulae from all previous event days till the current event day are calculated. 
According to Ntswane (2014), in order to compute cumulative abnormal return, average 
abnormal returns must be summoned to the window period as follows: 
         (6) 
Where CAARt is the cumulative average abnormal return in period t and t is the window period. 
Furthermore, this study employs t-tests to test the statistical significance of sovereign credit 
rating announcements on foreign exchange rates. Daily foreign exchange rate returns are tested 
to see if they significantly differ from the expected returns during the same window in 
accordance with recent studies by Cooke and Bailey (2015). The results will be significant if 
they are large on either side of the t-statistic of 0. The closer the t-statistic is to 0, the more 
insignificant the impact. The following equation is used: 
          (7) 
 
Where tα is the student t-test at significance level α and std (ARit) is the standard error of 
abnormal returns of country i at time t. According to Efron (1969), a t-test is a statistical test that 























rate returns. Oftentimes, a t-test is a statistical test used to determine whether a process or 
treatment actually has an effect on the population of interest, or whether two groups are 
different from one another. Consequently, in this study, the t-test is used to check whether 
sovereign credit ratings have an effect on exchange rate returns in Africa. 
3.4.5.  Causality 
As regional economies have grown to share relatively close fundamentals through trade and 
financial linkages, a change in a single country’s SCR profile usually has ripple effects that 
spread to other countries in the same region. Thus, countries are becoming more prone to 
common SCR shocks that arise from channels of potential interconnections. The magnitude of 
the spillovers transmitted across country borders depends on how vulnerable a financial system 
is (Enowbi et al., 2017). A country’s economy is more vulnerable to spillover impacts if it has 
weak macroeconomic fundamentals and a weak financial system. The magnitude of spillover 
exposures is further increased by the number and size of linkages with the real economy and 
financial system of other economies (Kalotychou et al., 2014). According to Chen, Chen, Yang 
et al. (2016), the following key financial and economic linkages that act as transmission 
channels through which spillovers might be transmitted from one financial market to another:  
First, real channels that involve linkages between major trading partners that largely depend on 
each other for export markets. Second, financial channels that provide linkages through trade 
credit, foreign direct investments and other capital flows among countries that have a high 
degree of financial market integration. Third, common creditor and interconnected lenders 
channel can be through international banks which creates shocks that spill over to the real and 
financial channels’ borrowing countries to weaken their capital position (Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010). Fourth, business interactions under a market-based financial system where 
spillovers are transmitted through asset price changes, measured risks and market-to-market 
capital of high leveraged institutions. Finally, the hedging channel creates spillover through 
portfolio rebalancing across financial markets as investors respond to market shocks by re-
examining and adjusting their portfolios to macroeconomic risks (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
2000).  
Thus, in order to determine whether an announcement in one country’s SCR has spillover 
effects in other credit-rated countries, this study applies causality tests to answer this sub-
question: (1) Does one country’s sovereign credit rating change cause significant spillover 
effects on other African countries’ exchange rates? 
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This study, therefore,  employs impulse response tests together with Granger causality tests in 
a panel framework to further explore the nexus between sovereign credit ratings and exchange 
rates in accordance with Afonso, Furceri and Gomes (2011) as follows: 
 (8) 
Where S, M and F take the values between 1 and 22 as given in Table 2 below, and pos is short 
for positive, neg is short for negative. 
Causality tests can then be computed by estimating separate regressions of the changes of 
exchange rate returns and ratings as follows: 
      (9) 
      (10) 
      (11) 
Where Q is foreign exchange rate returns and Z is a vector of independent variables influencing 
sovereign credit ratings and foreign exchange rates. The F-statistic is therefore applied to test 
the significance of the Granger causality to determine whether the model satisfies best fit 
requirements. Having examined the causal relationships among the factors, the analysis next 
uses impulse responses to assess the effect of sovereign credit rating shocks on exchange rate 
returns. The impulse response analysis quantifies the reaction of every single variable in the 
model on an exogenous shock to the model (Koop et al., 1996) and the reaction is measured for 
every variable at certain times after credit rating announcements. It is hypothesised that, if there 
is a reaction by one variable to an impulse in another variable, then the latter causes the former. 
In accordance with Khalid and Kawai (2003), in order to estimate the degree and timing of 
sovereign credit rating changes, the impulse response function ψt at time t is specified as 
follows: 
!! = "#!"$!           (12) 
 
Where Rt is the exchange rate return, and εt is the impulse from sovereign credit rating series 
as unit impulses. Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) note that the Granger causality test does not 
determine the relative strength of causality effects beyond the selected time span. Therefore, 
causality tests are unable to indicate the response of the endogenous variable to an impulse with 
another exogenous variable when shocking the residuals (Rajasekar et al., 2014). Thus, the 
Rit = (
1
3) Sit + Mit + Fit( )+ 0.5( posS + posM + posF )− 0.5(negS + negM + negF )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦



































impulse response function traces the effect of a one-unit shock to one of the variables on current 
and future values of all the endogenous variables in a system over various time horizons 
(Rahman & Shahbaz, 2013). Through impulse responses, the positive and negative 
relationships in relation to future periods can be specifically identified. 
3.5.  Research Data 
The empirical analysis makes use of data that consist of a dependent variable, one explanatory 
variable of interest and six control factors.  
3.6.  Timespan 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the transitory impact of sovereign credit ratings 
on foreign exchange rate returns in Africa over a 15-year period from 1 January 2003 to 31 
December 2018. This time frame was chosen because it is the period in which more African 
countries began receiving sovereign credit ratings and several credit rating changes took place. 
The study makes use of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating data issued by the 
three major credit rating agencies on 27 African countries. Prior to 2003, only South Africa and 
Mauritius received their first ratings in 1994 and 1996 respectively, followed by Botswana in 
2001 and Lesotho in 2002.  
3.7.  Dependent Factor 
The dependent factor comprises the daily exchanges rates between each of the sampled African 
currencies against the US dollar (hereinafter called data set 1). The African currencies’ 
historical daily exchange rate figures are obtained from Bloomberg. The research uses the US 
dollar (USD) because the bulk of Africa’s trade is in US dollars (Maradiaga & Hall, 2012). The 
data consist of 27 African countries that received sovereign credit ratings from the three major 
credit rating agencies in the period under study.  
3.8.  Long-Term Sovereign credit rating data 
The explanatory factor of interest is the long-term sovereign credit rating changes and outlooks 
of the African countries covering the same period and assigned by the three major credit rating 
agencies. Credit rating data are sourced from the countryeconomy.com website, which provides 
all credit ratings announced by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. The obtained ratings are averaged 
across the three credit rating agencies. In order to confirm the data credibility, the credit rating 
data from countryeconomy.com is compared to the sovereign credit ratings published by 
tradingeconomics.com. Not all African countries received consistent ratings from all three 
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major rating agencies therefore, where no data are available, the ratings were assumed to stay 





Table 2. Rating summary statistics of the 27 countries under study from 2003 to 2018 
(Sources: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, countryeconomy.com) 
 
 
In order to investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating and outlook announcements, the 
empirical analysis uses the approach of Gaillard (2009), an approach earlier used by Cantor and 
Packer (1996) with reference to Williams et al. (2013) and Alsakka et al.(2014), whereby the 
credit ratings employed by sovereign credit rating agencies are transformed from ordinal rating 





Table 3: Linear transformation of credit ratings: The letter ratings are converted into 
numbers for the purpose of estimation 
(Sources: Compiled by the author based on data from Moody’s, S&P, Fitch) 
 
 
Other sovereign credit rating events, such as changes in outlooks and watchlists, are taken into 
account by adding 0.5 for a positive change in outlook and -0.5 for a negative outlook. 
Similarly, 0.25 is added for a positive credit watch and -0.25 added for a negative credit watch 












AAA 23 Aaa 20 AAA 22
AA+ 22 Aa1 19 AA+ 21
AA 21 Aa2 18 AA 20
AA- 20 Aa3 17 AA- 19
A+ 19 A1 16 A+ 18
A 18 A2 15 A 17
A- 17 A3 14 A- 16
BBB+ 16 Baa1 13 BBB+ 15
BBB 15 Baa2 12 BBB 14
BBB- 14 Baa3 11 BBB- 13
BB+ 13 Ba1 10 BB+ 12
BB 12 Ba2 9 BB 11
BB- 11 Ba3 8 BB- 10
B+ 10 B1 7 B+ 9
B 9 B2 6 B 8
B- 8 B3 5 B- 7
CCC+ 7 Caa1 4 CCC+ 6
CCC 6 Caa2 3 CCC 5
CCC- 5 Caa3 2 CCC- 4
CC 4 Ca 1 CC 3
C 3 C 0 C 2
DDD 2 SD 1





3.9.  Limitations of the Study 
This empirical study is not without limitations. As some of the studies focusing on the impact 
of sovereign credit ratings on financial and capital markets in Africa, this study faces data 
limitations as well as methodological challenges and assumptions detailed below. 
3.9.1.  Data limitations 
• Not all countries in Africa received credit ratings from the three major credit rating 
agencies during the period under study. The study is limited to those countries in Africa 
that received credit ratings from 2003 to 2018. Even those countries that received 
sovereign credit ratings, some received them from just one CRA. Some countries did 
not receive periodic sovereign credit ratings. 
• In order to calculate abnormal returns around the time of sovereign credit rating 
announcements, there needs to be a benchmark for normal returns. However, there is 
no market return index for the African countries’ foreign exchange rates.  
3.9.2.  Data assumptions 
• As a result of the above-mentioned limitations, this study assumes the last given 
sovereign credit rating to be the sovereign credit rating in the period where none was 
given. 
• To overcome the lack of a benchmark for normal foreign exchange returns, an Africa 
Index is constructed. To solve this problem, a benchmark market return for Africa was 
constructed to represent the normal market return index for the foreign exchange rate 
for African countries for the period under study. 
3.9.3.  Methodological limitations 
• Mutize (2017) observes that a lack of transparency, limited information, inadequate 
regulatory frameworks and low institutional quality characterise Africa’s financial 
markets. This could potentially distort the nexus between sovereign credit rating 
announcements and Africa’s foreign exchange rates. Similarly, this study takes into 
consideration the same methodological limitations. 
• Event studies have the limitation of assuming that only one event occurs in the event 
window which poses a difficulty when more than one event occurs in the same period 
giving rise to biased results (Yang & Zhang, 2011). The choice of estimation window 
affects the results of event study methodologies. Therefore, different researchers could 
get different results using the same data if their estimation windows were different. In 
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addition, event study methodologies do not detect dynamic responses in correlations to 
new information and do not eliminate heteroskedasticity caused by volatility increases 
during a crisis (Eraslan, 2017) 
3.9.4.  Methodological assumptions 
• The methodology assumes that all unobservable factors correlate with the included 
variable and that the unobservable factors are time-invariant, implying that the factors 
mimic the individual specific constant term, and the variance of each of the 





RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
The main aim of this study is to investigate the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements 
on foreign exchange rate returns in Africa. The primary research question that this study sets 
out to investigate is: 
 
Do sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant impact on foreign exchange rate 
returns in Africa? 
In order to further examine the implications arising from the primary question, the following 
sub-questions are also explored: 
• Do sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades affect the exchange rate returns by 
the same magnitude? 
• Does one country’s sovereign credit rating change cause significant spillover effects on 
other African countries’ exchange rates? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter details the research findings of the empirical 
investigation of the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on foreign exchange rate 
returns in 27 African countries over the period from 2003 to 2018 using an event study 
methodology and Granger causality tests. Even though the first sub-question asks whether 
sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades affect the exchange rates by the same 
magnitude, the data set will not be sub-divided into upgrades and downgrades and outlooks 
because all SCR changes are classified as events in terms of the event study methodology (Yang 
& Zhang, 2011). 
4.2.  Unit Root Test Results 
Prior to running the empirical analysis, it is crucial to ascertain the stationarity conditions of 
the data to avoid spurious regression (Ventosa-Santaulària, 2009). The results of running panel 
unit root tests are presented in Table 4 below and show that the daily exchange rates and 




Table 4: Panel unit root test results 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 SCR FXR 
I(0) Test Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)     
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.057 0.145*** 4.37 1.000*** 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)     
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -5.6345 0.000*** 1.961 0.975*** 
ADF -Fisher Chi-square 161.138 0.000*** 71.666 0.054*** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 171.178 0.000*** 264.896 0.000*** 
I(1) test    
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)     
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -210.474 0.000*** -208.955 0.000*** 
      
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)     
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -179.708 0.000*** -209.508 0.000*** 
ADF -Fisher Chi-square 372.410 0.000*** 3411.870 0.000*** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 423.676 0.000*** 497.358 0.000*** 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
    
4.3.  Event Study Results 
After determining the stationarity of the data, the discussion of the results proceeds to the event 
study used to determine the nexus between sovereign credit rating event announcements and 
foreign exchange rates in Africa. Table 5 below presents a summary of the sovereign credit 
rating events employed to test the significance of abnormal returns in the chosen event 
windows. As can be seen, African countries received a total of 117 downgrades compared to 
just 47 upgrades, which accords with Mutize and Gossel’s (2018) contention that once an 
African sovereign is downgraded, it is difficult to recover and get an sovereign credit rating 
upgrade. 
Furthermore, contrary to the findings by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) that positive and 
negative credit news has a significant impact on both home country and other countries’ 
exchange rates, the results in Table 5 suggest that exchange rates in Africa do not react to an 
sovereign credit rating downgrade or upgrade announcement as evidenced by the insignificant 
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average abnormal returns t-tests of 254 countries. The two exceptions however are Egypt and 
Nigeria. Egypt’s t-test result of 2.68 is significant at 1% level, and Nigeria’s t-test result of 1.83 
is significant at 10% level. At face value, the abnormal average t-test results for Egypt and 
Nigeria would seem to indicate that sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant 
impact on the foreign exchange rates of these two countries and thus further analysis was 






































4 The t-test results for the following countries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Congo, DRC, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.  
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Table 5: Summary of sovereign credit rating events and Abnormal Returns (AR) t-test 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Country  Currency 
No. of  
Upgrades 
No. of  
Downgrades 
No. of  
Outlooks 





Angola AOA 4 8 11 4 0.10 
Benin  XOF 1 - 3 - -0.07 
Botswana BWP - 1 11 - -0.06 
Burkina Faso  XOF 1 1 6 1 -0.04 
Cameroon  XAF 2 2 10 1 -0.03 
Cape Verde CVE - 2 15 1 0.07 
Congo  XAF 5 13 17 3 0.03 
DRC CDF - 1 7 - -0.13 
Egypt EGP 5 17 38 5 2.68** 
Gabon  XAF - 5 14 1 -0.05 
Ghana GHS 3 6 24 - 0.09 
Ivory Coast  XOF 1 - 4 - 0.02 
Kenya KES 1 2 14 1 -0.04 
Lesotho LSL 1 1 9 - 0.10 
Malawi MWK 2 - 13 1 -0.06 
Mauritius MUR - 1 3 2 -0.08 
Morocco MAD 2 - 15 - 0.12 
Mozambique MZN 3 15 20 4 -0.02 
Namibia NAD - 2 8 - -0.04 
Nigeria NGN 1 6 20 3 1.83* 
Rwanda RWF 3 1 12 - -0.11 
Senegal  XOF - 1 8 - -0.06 
Seychelles SCR 3 - 5 - -0.11 
South Africa ZAR 6 10 34 5 0.11 
Tunisia TND 2 13 21 3 -0.11 
Uganda UGX 1 2 11 - -0.06 
Zambia ZMW - 7 19 - 0.06 
  47 117 372 35  
* represents significance at 1% level (>2.575)    
** represents significance at 5% level (>1.960)    





The results presented in Tables 6(a) and 6(b) below show that Nigeria and Egypt achieved 
abnormal returns in the event window from 1 November 2016 to 21 November 2016. The 
abnormal returns achieved by Egypt can be attributed to the 48% devaluation associated with 
the flotation of the Egyptian currency to meet the International Monetary Fund requirement in 
order to secure a USD 12 billion loan over three years (Reuters,(2016). Similarly, Nigeria 
devalued its currency by 30% when its central bank removed the currency peg (Reuters, 2016). 
Thus, these results suggest that an African currency devaluation is associated with positive 
abnormal returns, which accords with Momodu and Akani (2016) who suggest that, in the short 








































Table 6(a): Nigeria’s sovereign credit rating significance test results in June 2016 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Nigeria 
 











16-6-13 199.050 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.077  
16-6-14 199.050 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.226  
16-6-15 198.500 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -5.615 * 
16-6-16 198.500 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.131  
16-6-17 199.000 0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.003 5.417 * 
16-6-18 199.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
16-6-19 199.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
16-6-20 282.500 0.350 0.032 0.001 0.350 713.513 * 
16-6-21 284.500 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.007 14.384 * 
16-6-22 282.500 -0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 -14.252 * 
16-6-23 281.250 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 -8.882 * 
16-6-24 281.750 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.001 2.968 * 
16-6-25 281.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
16-6-26 281.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
16-6-27 282.250 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.002 3.228 * 
16-6-28 282.250 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.251  
16-6-29 282.750 0.002 -0.004 0.000 0.002 3.842 * 
16-6-30 280.500 -0.008 0.000 0.000 -0.008 -16.311 * 
16-7-1 282.130 0.006 -0.003 0.000 0.006 12.002 * 
16-7-2 282.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
16-7-3 282.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002  
* represents significance at 1% level (>2.575)     
** represents significance at 5% level (>1.960)     











Table 6(b): Egypt’s sovereign credit rating significance test results in November 2016 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Egypt 
 











16-11-1 8.879 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -1.401  
16-11-2 8.877 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.466  
16-11-3 13.891 0.448 0.045 0.001 0.446 1172.000 * 
16-11-4 15.377 0.102 0.010 0.000 0.101 265.969 * 
16-11-5 15.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-6 15.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-7 16.533 0.072 0.006 0.000 0.072 189.720 * 
16-11-8 17.377 0.050 0.004 0.000 0.050 130.281 * 
16-11-9 17.424 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.003 6.676 * 
16-11-10 16.505 -0.054 0.002 0.000 -0.054 -142.497 * 
16-11-11 16.543 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 5.759 * 
16-11-12 16.543 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-13 16.543 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-14 15.575 -0.060 -0.002 0.000 -0.060 -158.089 * 
16-11-15 15.381 -0.013 -0.002 0.000 -0.013 -32.882 * 
16-11-16 15.643 0.017 0.004 0.000 0.017 43.995 * 
16-11-17 15.935 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.018 48.184 * 
16-11-18 15.946 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.001 1.561  
16-11-19 15.946 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-20 15.946 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.054  
16-11-21 17.571 0.097 0.006 0.000 0.097 254.221 * 
* represents significance at 1% level (>2.575)     
** represents significance at 5% level (>1.960)     
*** represents significance at 10% level (>1.645)     
 
Table 7a shows the results of the AR t-tests of the significant returns based on upgrades and 
downgrades. In order to conduct the tests, the 27 African countries were grouped according to 
their sovereign credit rating class as assigned by the three credit rating agencies. The average 
abnormal returns t-test results show that the sovereign credit rating class assigned to African 
countries does not significantly affect foreign exchange rate movements, which is contrary to 
the assertion by Eraslan (2017) that sovereign credit rating announcements are more likely to 
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impact foreign exchange rate co-movements of countries in the speculative grade. 
The results thus show that there is no significant nexus between sovereign credit rating 
announcements and foreign exchange rates in Africa, which may be attributed to two possible 
reasons. First, Africa’s financial sector development is still nascent (Otchere, Senbet and 
Simbanegavi, 2017) and thus it may take longer for the flow of information and the associated 
impact of sovereign credit rating announcements to filter through the continent’s financial 
systems. Second, there is a disjoint between Africa’s foreign exchange markets and 
macroeconomic fundamentals (Mutize and Mugobo, 2016) as a result of weak monetary 
policies (Sahn et al., 1996), expansionary policies (Masson & Pattillo, 2002) and weak 
currencies (Okafor, 2015).  
 
Table 7a: Sovereign credit rating significance test results 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Sovereign credit rating upgrades Sovereign credit rating downgrades 




Sovereign credit rating 




S&P/Fitch (Moody's) upgrades t-test S&P/Fitch (Moody's) downgrades t-test 
A- (A3) to A (A2) - - A (A2) to A− (A3) 1 -0.06 
BBB+ (Baa1) to A- (A3) 2 0.02 A− (A3) to BBB+ (Baa1) 1 0.11 
BBB (Baa2) to BBB+ (Baa1) 1 0.11 BBB+ (Baa1) to BBB (Baa2) 1 -0.08 
BBB- (Baa3) to BBB (Baa2) 2 0.00 BBB (Baa2) to BBB− (Baa3) 2 0.00 
BB+ (Ba1) to BBB− (Baa3) 1 0.12 BBB− (Baa3) to BB+ (Ba1) 4 0.45 
BB (Ba2) to BB+ (Ba1) 2 0.00 BB+ (Ba1) to BB (Ba2) 3 0.89 
BB− (Ba3) to BB (Ba2 1 0.10 BB (Ba2) to BB− (Ba3) 2 1.28 
B+ (B1) to BB− (Ba3) 6 0.32 BB− (Ba3) to B+ (B1) 7 0.66 
B (B2) to B+ (B1) 7 -0.05 B+ (B1) to B (B2) 13 0.34 
B− (B3) to B (B2) 5 0.48 B (B2) to B− (B3 9 0.31 
CCC+ (Caa1) to B− (B3) 4 0.70 B− (B3) to CCC+ (Caa1) 5 0.53 
CCC (Caa2) to CCC+ (Caa1) 1 2.68 CCC+ (Caa1) to CCC (Caa2) 3 0.90 
* represents significance at 1% level (>2.575)   
** represents significance at 5% level (>1.960)   










Table 7b: Summary of rating upgrades, downgrades and significant coefficients 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
As can be seen in Table 7b above, the coefficient, in most instances, mimics the direction of 
the sovereign credit action. With most countries, when a sovereign credit rating action is an 
upgrade, then the coefficient is positive. On the other hand, when the sovereign credit rating 
action is a downgrade, the coefficient is negative. 
4.4.  Estimation of sovereign credit rating announcements’ impact on foreign exchange 
rate 
Table 8 below shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for foreign exchange rates 




Table 8: Estimation of sovereign credit rating announcements’ impact on foreign 
exchange rate returns 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
Window Upgrade Downgrade Negative Positive 
 
CAAR CAAR CAAR CAAR 
Day 
All countries All countries All countries All countries 
-10 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
-9 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 
-8 0.004 -0.003 -0.006 0.003 
-7 0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.006 
-6 0.007 -0.007 -0.008 0.009 
-5 0.009 -0.011 -0.010 0.009 
-4 0.011 -0.016 -0.011 0.009 
-3 0.012 -0.019 -0.011 0.010 
-2 0.012 -0.025 -0.013 0.010 
-1 0.015 -0.032 -0.014 0.011 
0 0.018 -0.039 -0.014 0.011 
+1 0.025 -0.042 -0.016 0.013 
+2 0.027 -0.043 -0.018 0.015 
+3 0.026 -0.047 -0.017 0.014 
+4 0.019 -0.046 -0.015 0.014 
+5 0.016 -0.039 -0.012 0.011 
+6 0.012 -0.031 -0.012 0.010 
+7 0.012 -0.027 -0.010 0.009 
+8 0.014 -0.022 -0.010 0.009 
+9 0.014 -0.017 -0.011 0.010 
+10 0.011 -0.011 -0.011 0.009 
* represents significance at 1% level (>2.575)  
** represents significance at 5% level (>1.960)  







Figure 5: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns graphs  
(Source: Made by the researcher) 
 
As shown in Table 8 above, the reaction of exchange rate returns to sovereign credit ratings is 
insignificant.  There is a positive reaction to the upgrade announcement on rated sovereigns. 
Even though the impact is not significant, the positive reactions persist throughout the entire 
window period from day -10 to day +10. Similarly, there is a negative reaction to a downgrade. 
Even though it is insignificant, it however persists through the entire event window. It is 
noteworthy that, for both upgrades and downgrades, there are respective positive and negative 
reactions that start from day -10 and p-values keep increasing until day +3 when they begin to 
decline. Additionally, the reaction to either a rating upgrade or downgrade is felt more after the 
announcement and takes longer to subside, as compared to the reaction before the sovereign 
credit rating announcement. As highlighted in Table 8 above, even though the impact is 
insignificant, sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades do not affect the exchange rate 
returns by the same magnitude. As depicted by the cumulative average abnormal return graphs 
in Figure 5 above, the reaction of exchange rate returns in the window encompassing a positive 
outlook mimics the reaction of exchange rates in the window encompassing an SCR upgrade 
announcement. Similarly, the reaction of exchange rate returns in the window encompassing a 
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negative outlook mimics the reaction of exchange rates in the window encompassing an SCR 
downgrade rating announcement.  
 
4.5.  Granger Causality Results 
The aim of this study was to provide evidence of the impact of sovereign credit rating 
announcements of exchange rates. With Granger causality tests, there are two main 
approaches.  One approach would be to use the ECM model via MLE to conduct the tests on 
noncausality in accordance with Johansen (1997) or to choose to apply alternative methods 
such as in Toda and Yamamoto (1995).  This study uses this alternative approach by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) mainly due to its simplicity when compared to Johansen’s LR test. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis becomes that sovereign credit rating announcements do not 
Granger cause exchange rate volatility in each of the African countries under study. Table 9 
below presents the p-values from the Granger causality tests performed between sovereign 
credit ratings (SCR) and the exchange rates (FXR) at 2, 4, 6 and 8 lags. 
 
Table 9: Pairwise Granger Causality test results 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
  Lags: 2 Lags: 4 Lags: 6 Lags: 8 
 F-Statistic Prob. F-Statistic Prob. F-Statistic Prob. F-Statistic Prob. 
         
SCR ->FXR 0.080 0.924 0.275 0.895 0.686 0.661 0.511 0.811 
FXR ->SCR 0.213 0.808 0.581 0.676 0.429 0.860 0.356 0.944 
 
Across all lags, the results show that there is no significant evidence that sovereign credit rating 
announcements Granger cause exchange rate volatility in African countries. The null 





4.6.  Impulse responses 
Table 10a: Impulse response tests results for North Africa region 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
 
Table 10b: Impulse response tests results for East Africa region 




The results of the exchange rate return impulse responses to Cholesky’s one standard deviation 
sovereign rating shock for countries in the regions of North Africa and East Africa are presented 
in Tables 10a and 10b above with the rest presented in Appendix B. The results indicate that, 
when a sovereign rating is shocked by one standard deviation, the regional stock and bond 
markets generally respond by less than 1% and this effect fades away within four days of a 
sovereign rating change. Thus, the regional sovereign rating spillover impact is very small and 
its effects are quickly absorbed into stock and bond market prices. The cross-country impulse 
responses from a sovereign rating shock in one country to the sovereign ratings in other 
countries in the region are also marginal but persist for more than 10 periods. These effects 
could be attributed to regional financial and economic integration (Braun and Raddatz 2007) 
associated with capital account liberalisation (Eichengreen, Gullapalli, and Panizza 2011), 
financial deregulation and financial innovation (Causevic 2003) as well as with monetary 
unions (Bayar, Kiliç, and Savrul 2013) such as the CFA franc in West and Central Africa, the 
dinar in North Africa and the Rand3 indexed currencies in Southern and Eastern Africa. Thus, 
the sovereign rating shock originating from any of the countries in the same region is 
transmitted to all other countries’ credit ratings. As suggested by Claeys and Vašíˇcek (2012), 
the bilateral linkages between these countries open the channels of capital and cross-country 
information flows that determine sovereign rating spillovers and contagion. Hence, the results 
show that Drago and Gallo’s (2016) findings of a spillover effect on financial markets of other 
countries following credit rating announcements, transmitted through the international 






RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1.  Research Conclusion 
The major source of external funding for developing markets is made up of foreign direct 
investment and portfolio flows. Emerging markets, of which Africa is included, are more 
sensitive to capital flows due to the potential relationship between these capital flows and 
financial indicators such as exchange rate, inflation and interest rate. This study examined the 
effects of sovereign credit ratings on foreign exchange rate returns for a sample of 27 African 
countries over the period 2003–2018 to examine the response of exchange rate co-movements 
around the time of sovereign rating announcements. There are a number of studies in literature 
that focused on investigating the impact of sovereign credit ratings on the bond and stock 
markets. In contrast, there are few that investigated the nexus between sovereign credit ratings 
and exchange rates. Therefore, this study makes a contribution to closing that gap in literature 
by investigating the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on exchange rate returns 
in Africa. Following other studies, this study employed an event study methodology and 
Granger causality tests as well as impulse response tests in a panel framework to explore the 
nexus between sovereign credit ratings and exchange rates. The results of all methods utilised 
find that African foreign exchange rates are not significantly affected by sovereign credit rating 
announcements and there is no evidence of contagion found.  
5.1.1.  Do sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant impact on foreign 
exchange rate returns in Africa? 
Sovereign credit ratings do bring new information to financial markets as suggested by 
empirical evidence in literature. One characteristic of emerging economies is that of 
informational asymmetry, and a number of studies suggest that sovereign credit rating 
announcements fill this deficiency. However, according to results of this study, the abnormal 
returns t-test results of the 27 countries in Africa are insignificant and this suggests that 
sovereign credit rating announcements do not significantly impact exchange rate returns in 
Africa. This is in contrast to Brooks et al. (2004) who showed that sovereign credit rating 
downgrades, specifically those by Fitch and S&P, resulted in the negative aggregate stock 




5.1.2.  Do sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades affect the  exchange rates by 
the same magnitude? 
While exchange rates in Africa do not react significantly to a sovereign credit rating downgrade 
or upgrade announcement, the results of this study show that, when a sovereign credit rating 
downgrade is announced, abnormal returns t-tests are greater than those when a sovereign credit 
rating upgrade is announced. The results imply that in Africa punishment for a downgrade is 
more than a reward for an upgrade. 
5.1.3.  Does one country’s sovereign credit rating change cause significant spillover 
effects on other African countries’ exchange rates? 
While sovereign credit rating events are found to have a marginal impact on the own country’s 
exchange rates, there is no significant evidence of contagion. The results of the impulse 
response tests find no significant evidence of sovereign rating spillover effects in foreign 
exchange rate returns. Impulse response analysis further shows that the cross-country sovereign 
rating spillover impacts are insignificant. This may be because the currency impacts are too 
marginal to spill over to other countries and are a result of the significant structural deficiencies 
in African trade and cross border financial linkages. This finding is in line with Ndikumana 
(2003) who characterises Africa as having a weak macro-economic environment, 
underdeveloped financial systems, high country risks and exchange rate misalignments. 
In summary, sovereign credit rating events have no significant impact on exchange rates in 
Africa within the borders of the countries that received the ratings and no contagion on 
neighbouring countries. This is in contrast to findings of spillovers by Eraslan (2017) when 
investigating the impact of sovereign rating announcements on emerging market exchange rate 
correlations. However, it could be argued that the investigation by Eraslan (2017) included non-
African countries in the data set.  
This study found no significant nexus between sovereign credit rating announcements and 
foreign exchange rates in Africa that may be attributed to two possible reasons. First, Africa’s 
financial sector development is still nascent (Otchere, Senbet and Simbanegavi, 2017) and thus 
sovereign credit rating announcements may take longer for the flow of information and the 
associated impact to filter through the continent’s financial systems. The finding lends support 
to the efficient market paradigm which is based on the random walk theory. The random walk 
theory suggests that future price changes represent random departures from previous prices 
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(Gupta et al., 2014). The logic of the random walk idea is that, if the flow of information is 
unimpeded and information is immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s price 
change will reflect only tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price changes today. 
Under this efficient market paradigm, sovereign credit rating announcements should therefore 
only have a potential impact on exchange rates on the day they are announced, not days leading 
up to the announcement and certainly not days after the announcement  
Second, there is a disjoint between Africa’s foreign exchange markets and macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Mutize and Mugobo, 2016) as a result of weak monetary policies (Sahn et al., 
1996), expansionary policies (Masson & Pattillo, 2002) and weak currencies (Okafor, 2015). 
The disjoint between Africa’s foreign exchange markets and macroeconomic fundamentals 
identified by Mutize and Mugobo (2016) lends credit to another possible reason why there is 
no significant impact on exchange rates by sovereign credit rating events. This is the hypothesis 
that sovereign credit ratings lag behind. With this hypothesis, any impact from the sovereign 
credit rating announcements will only be visible after a considerable amount of time has passed 
and this would not be beyond the 21-day event window used in this event study. This is why 
one of the recommendations for further study is to potentially enlarge the event window in order 
to explore the long-term dynamics. 
5.2.  Policy Implications 
This study investigated the impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on foreign 
exchange rate returns in Africa. The following research question formed the basis of the 
investigation: 
 
Do sovereign credit rating announcements have a significant impact on foreign exchange rate 
returns in Africa?  
 
In order to further examine the implications arising from the primary question, the following 
sub-questions are also explored: 
• Do sovereign credit rating downgrades or upgrades affect the exchange rates by the 
same magnitude? 
• Does one country’s sovereign credit rating change cause significant spillover effects on 
other African countries’ exchange rates? 
The results of this study have the following policy implications: 
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• The findings of the study showed that exchange rate returns react to sovereign credit 
ratings, but the impact is insignificant. However, despite this weak response of foreign 
exchange rates to sovereign credit rating announcements, governments in Africa should 
still continue to consider sovereign credit rating announcements as they provide new 
information to the financial markets.  
• The lack of evidence of contagion between African countries proved that African 
countries have disjointed markets and there are none to few trade linkages amongst the 
African countries studied. Therefore, African governments should work towards 
regional integration to strengthen and deepen cross-border trade and financial linkages. 
This will encourage and enhance cross-border trade between neighbouring countries. 
Regional integration would provide the much-needed trade linkages given the proposed 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by the African Union that would pave the way for 
the establishment of the Continental Customs Union and the African Customs Union. 
• Furthermore, the findings have shown evidence supporting the narrative that there is a 
disjoint between Africa’s foreign exchange markets and macroeconomic fundamentals 
(Mugobo & Mutize, 2016). African countries should address macroeconomic 
deficiencies stipulated by credit rating agencies when they announce credit ratings and 
focus on improving other factors that contribute to sovereign credit rating upgrades such 
as good governance and improving macroeconomic fundamentals.  These reforms will 
ensure that Africa is attractive for capital flows and encourage domestic investment. 
• Even though many countries have leaned towards liberalising their exchange rate 
regimes, which has not brought forth the expected systemic gains in income growth, 
trade performance and price stability (Ndikumana, 2003), it is advisable for African 
economies to maintain selective discretionary control over capital movements and 
exchange rate markets in order to hedge against adverse shocks to the economy and to 
maintain macroeconomic and financial stability. Furthermore, reforms meant to 
improve the credibility of Africa’s macroeconomic policy are needed. 
5.3.  Recommendations for Further Study 
This study examined the effects of sovereign credit ratings on foreign exchange rate returns in 
Africa using a sample of 27 African countries over the period 2003–2018. However, the 
following are recommendations for future research: 
• The analysis could further investigate the regional development effects by focusing on 
the different regional economic communities in Africa such as countries in Southern 
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African Development Community (SADC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East 
African Community (EAC), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
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APPENDIX A: Credit rating grading applied by the three 
credit rating agencies in this study 
 
Interpretation Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Investment grade ratings    
Prime Aaa AAA AAA 
High grade 
Aa1 AA+ AA+ 
Aa2 AA AA 
Aa3 AA- AA- 
Upper medium grade 
A1 A+ A+ 
A2 A A 
A3 A- A- 
Lower medium grade 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 
Baa2 BBB BBB 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 
Speculative grade ratings    
Speculative    
Ba1 BB+ BB+ 
Ba2 BB BB 
Ba3 BB- BB- 
Highly speculative 
B1 B+ B+ 
B2 B B 
B3 B- B- 
Substantial risks 
Caa1 CCC+ CCC+ 
Caa2 CCC  CCC  
Caa3 CCC- CCC- 
Extremely speculative Ca CC CC 
    C 
In default with little chance for recovery   SD RD 
In default   
C D D 
  DD 
    DDD 
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